wolfblitzzer0

08:47 PM

(PilotsFor911Truth.org) - Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) is a device used to send messages to and from an aircraft. Very similar to text messages and email we use today, Air Traffic Control, the airline itself, and other airplanes can communicate with each other via this "texting" system. ACARS was developed in 1978 and is still used today. Similar to cell phone networks, the ACARS network has remote ground stations installed around the world to route messages from ATC, the airline, etc, to the aircraft depending on it's location and vice versa. ACARS Messages have been provided through the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) which demonstrate that the aircraft received messages through ground stations located in Harrisburg, PA, and then later routed through a ground station in Pittsburgh, 20 minutes after the aircraft allegedly impacted the South Tower in New York. How can messages be routed through such remote locations if the aircraft was in NY, not to mention how can messages be routed to an aircraft which allegedly crashed 20 minutes earlier? Pilots For 9/11 Truth have briefly touched on this subject in 9/11: Intercepted through the excellent research of "Woody Box", who initially discovered such alarming information in the released FOIA documents(1). We now have further information which confirms the aircraft was not in the vicinity of New York City when the attacks occurred.

This evidence strengthens previous evidence uncovered by Pilots For 9/11 Truth that a standard 767 cannot remain in control, stable or hold together at the speeds reported by the NTSB for the South Tower aircraft(6). So, if UA175 was somewhere out in Pennsylvania when an aircraft was observed to strike the south tower, and a standard 767 cannot perform at such excessive speeds as reported, then where did the airplane come from which was observed to strike the South Tower? That is a great question and the reason we are still here after 10 years attempting to get answers for the day that changed our world, and will never go away until those questions are answered.

Click here to read more and for discussion....

Here, below for the long detailed article.
http://pilotsfor911truth.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=21754&hl=ACARS+CONFIRMED+9/11

This confirms that the airplane that hit at WTC was not 175, as many of us have suspected for so long.

I'm curious if it's possible to extrapolate the heading or position of the aircraft? It seems to be generally westbound. I wonder if it made it to Cleveland? I wonder if ACARS data can suggest a landing point?

**Peter Lemkin** · 12-02-2011 08:55 PM

ACARS CONFIRMED - 9/11 AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE LONG AFTER CRASH
UNITED 175 IN THE VICINITY OF HARRISBURG AND PITTSBURGH, PA
(PilotsFor911Truth.org) - Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) is a device used to send messages to and from an aircraft. Very similar to text messages and email we use today, Air Traffic Control, the airline itself, and other airplanes can communicate with each other via this "texting" system. ACARS was developed in 1978 and is still used today. Similar to cell phone networks, the ACARS network has remote ground stations installed around the world to route messages from ATC, the airline, etc, to the aircraft depending on it's location and vice versa. ACARS Messages have been provided through the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) which demonstrate that the aircraft received messages through ground stations located in Harrisburg, PA, and then later routed through a ground station in Pittsburgh, 20 minutes after the aircraft allegedly impacted the South Tower in New York. How can messages be routed through such remote locations if the aircraft was in NY, not to mention how can messages be routed to an aircraft which allegedly crashed 20 minutes earlier? Pilots For 9/11 Truth have briefly touched on this subject in 9/11: Intercepted through the excellent research of "Woody Box", who initially discovered such alarming information in the released FOIA documents(1). We now have further information which confirms the aircraft was not in the vicinity of New York City when the attacks occurred.
These are the 'text' (ACARS) messages in question -
The format for these messages is pretty straight forward. To limit the technical details, we will explain the most important parts of the messages, however, for full Message Block Format Code standards, click here. The remote ground station (MDT in the message below) used to route the message to the aircraft, the time and date in which the message is sent (111259, meaning the 11th of Sept, at 1259Z or 0859 Eastern), the flight number (UA175), and the tail number of the airplane in which the message is intended (N612UA), are all highlighted in red. The underlined date and time is when the message was received by the airplane.

This message was sent on Sept 11, at 1259Z (8:59AM Eastern) to United Flight 175, tail number N612UA, routed through the MDT remote ground station (Harrisburg International Airport, also known as Middleton).

DDLXCXA SFOLM CHI58R SFOFRSAM
.SFOLMUA 111259/JER
CMD
AN N612UA/GL MDT
- QUSFOLMUA 1UA175 BOSLAX
I HEARD OF A REPORTED INCIDENT ABOARD YOUR ACFT. PLZ VERIFY ALL
IS NORMAL....THX 777SAM
SFOLM JERRY TSEN

;09111259 108575 0543

This message was sent on Sept 11, at 1303Z (9:03AM Eastern, the time of the crash) to United Flight 175, tail number N612UA, routed through the MDT remote ground station (Harrisburg International Airport, also known as Middleton).

DDLXCXA CHIAK CH158R
.CHIAKUA 111303/ED
CMD
AN N612UA/GL MDT
- QUCHIYRUA 1UA175 BOSLAX
- MESSAGE FROM CHIDD -
HOW IS THE RIDE. ANY THING DISPATCH CAN DO FOR YOU...
CHIDD ED BALLINGER

;09111303 108575 0545

This message was also sent on Sept 11, at 1303Z (9:03AM Eastern, the time of the crash) to United Flight 175, tail number N612UA, routed through the MDT remote ground station (Harrisburg International Airport, also known as Middleton).

DDLXCXA CHIYR CH158R
.CHIYRUA 111303/AD
CMD
AN N612UA/GL MDT
- QUCHIYRUA 1UA175 BOSLAX
- MESSAGE FROM CHIDD -
NY APROACH LOOKIN FOR YA ON 127.4
CHIDD AD ROGERS

;09111303 108575 0546

This message was sent on Sept 11, at 1323Z (9:23AM Eastern, 20 minutes after the time of the crash) to United Flight 175, tail number N612UA, routed through the PIT remote ground station (Pittsburgh International Airport).

DDLXCXA CHIAK CH158R
.CHIAKUA DA 111323/ED
CMD
AN N612UA/GL PIT
- QUCHIYRUA 1UA175 BOSLAX
- MESSAGE FROM CHIDD -
/BEWARE ANY COCKPIT INTROUSION: TWO AIRCAFT IN NY . HIT TRADE C
NTER BUILDS...
CHIDD ED BALLINGER

;09111323 108575 0574

If one references the standard message block codes linked above, you will notice that a "Technical Acknowledgement" section should be present in ACARS messages. What this means, is that the ACARS system can confirm if the sent 'text' messages have been received or not without requiring any crew input to manually acknowledge the message was received. Similar to an email which may have bounced back, or your cell phone telling you that your text message failed to send, this automatic technical acknowledgement would let the reader know the message failed receipt, or if it were received. An ACK or NAK should be present denoting received or failed, respectively, according to standard message formats. Unfortunately, these standard codes are not available in the above messages. However, according to a Memorandum For The Record(2) quoting United Dispatcher Ed Ballinger, the second time stamp on the bottom of the message, at United Airlines, is the "Technical Acknowledgement" from the airplane that the message has been received -

Mr. Ballinger stated that the ACARS messages have two times listed: the time sent and the time received. He stated that once he sends the message it is delivered to the addressed aircraft through AIRINC immediately. He is not aware of any delay in the aircraft receiving the message after he sends it.

According to the above statement made by Mr. Ballinger, all of the above messages were received by the aircraft.
The 9/11 Commission has claimed which messages have been received by the aircraft. According to a another Memorandum For The Record (MFR), four ACARS messages were sent between 8:59AM and 9:03AM on the morning of Sept 11, to United Flight 175. The MFR reads as follows(3) -

1259:19Z A dispatcher-initiated message that reached the plane but not crew acknowledged stating "I heard of a reported incident."
1259:29 Additional dispatcher-initiated message
1259:30 Additional dispatcher-initiated message
1303:17 Rogers-initiated message not received by the aircraft

The first message at 1259:19Z, as stated, was received by the aircraft, but not crew acknowledged, which is not required as technical acknowledgements are automatic. This is referring to the message noted above sent through MDT by Jerry TSEN (First coded ACARS message at top). The second (1259:29Z) and third messages (1259:30Z) referenced in the MFR were not provided through the FOIA. The last message (1303:17Z) referenced in the MFR is claimed to not have been received by the aircraft according to the 9/11 Commission. However, all we have is their word, which contradicts the statement made by Ballinger and the Technical Acknowledgement time stamp. The coded Rogers initiated ACARS message is included above, third from the top. Of course, the 9/11 Commission cannot admit if the last message was received by the airplane as that would immediately indicate to anyone that the airplane did not crash into the South Tower at 09:03am.
It is interesting to note that the Commission ignores the 9:03am ACARS message sent by Ed Ballinger routed through MDT (second ACARS message printed above), yet claims the 9:03am message sent by Rogers as not being received. Based on sequential numbers of the messages themselves, it is clear Ballinger's 9:03 message was sent before the Rogers message (0545 for Ballinger message, 0546 for Rogers, printed on bottom of the message), yet the Commission ignores Ballinger's message. Why would they ignore Ballinger's message, yet acknowledge Rogers? Is it because Ballinger's message was received by the airplane and they realized that an aircraft cannot receive an ACARS message at that distance and such low altitude? This message is more evidence the aircraft was in the vicinity of Harrisburg, and not NY. At least 3 ACARS messages were routed through MDT between 8:59 and 9:03am, and received by the airplane, according to the technical acknowledgement time stamps at the bottom of the messages.
The last message sent at 9:23AM, routed through Pittsburgh, has been completely ignored by the 9/11 Commission as well. Although important to know whether the messages were received, it is equally if not more important to understand how they are routed, received or not.
ACARS Networks are based on ARINC Standards for communications in the United States. ARINC is a provider of the communication protocol for ACARS networking. As ACARS networks are to Cell Phones, think of ARINC as perhaps a Verizon or AT&T. When a message is sent from the aircraft, or the ground, the message needs to be routed through remote ground stations as described above. Many remote ground stations (RGS) are located throughout the world. Here is a diagram of some of the stations located in the Northeast USA.

Click To Enlarge

Comprehensive List Of ACARS Remote Ground Stations Worldwide - scribd source link - Page 100

If you get on an airplane in say Chicago, headed for NY, you turn off your cell phone and off you go. When you arrive in NY, you turn on your cell phone and see you have a message waiting. Was this message routed through a cell tower in Chicago? No, you would never receive it, nor be alerted that you have a message waiting. It is routed through a cell tower in NY. How does the cell network know where you are?
Although not exactly the same, but similar to how cell phones track your phone based on location, choosing the best cell towers to route messages to your phone, ACARS networks track the aircraft in flight and know where the aircraft is in order to route messages to the aircraft (or vice versa) through the best remote stations on the ground. When a message is sent from the ground or in flight, it is routed through a Central Processing System. This system determines the best routing to a ground station based on the aircraft location. Two types of flight tracking (or flight following) protocols are used for this process. Category A and B.
First is Category A. This type of flight following uses Flight Tracking messages automatically sent from the aircraft, typically every 10 minutes. These messages are a data link and do not contain any text, therefore the customer airline does not receive these messages, they are used for Flight Tracking purposes only. When the Flight Tracking message is sent, the Central Processing System (CPS) recognizes which stations it has been sent through and picks the three best stations for routing messages to and from the aircraft. After roughly 10 minutes, another Flight Tracking message is sent from the aircraft, through a new set of ground stations in the vicinity of it's new location, and the Central Processing System dumps the old stations and replaces it with new stations better for routing messages to the aircraft. This process continues throughout the flight automatically.
The second type of Flight Tracking, Category B, is a bit more simple. The aircraft continuously monitors all stations as it travels on it's course. The Central Processing System continuously chooses the best station for routing purposes while the aircraft is in flight. If the flight plan route is amended in flight, and a diversion is necessary, the Central Processing System chooses a new remote ground station along the diverted flight path based on this flight tracking protocol, tracking the aircraft.
The reason for this type of flight tracking, Category A and B, is due to the fact aircraft divert from their flight plans all the time, daily. Some have argued that MDT and PIT were chosen for ground station routing due to the original planned route of flight, BOS to LAX. However, if ACARS routing was based on original flight planned route, aircraft diverting from their original route of flight would not be able to communicate via ACARS as they would quickly leave the areas in which remote ground stations have been chosen, rendering the network useless for the airline, and most importantly, the aircraft. On 9/11 especially, many aircraft were diverted from their original flight plans. If the ACARS network was solely based on flight planned route, 100's if not thousands of aircraft, would not have been able to communicate with their company and/or ATC via ACARS. Chaos would have ensued as ACARS communication is a valuable asset to facilitate aircraft operations and flight safety, and the skies would never have been cleared as quickly as reported.
Some have further gone on to speculate that United Airlines Dispatchers routed the messages themselves based on flight planned route. Flight Tracking protocol as described renders this argument moot as the Dispatcher does not have control over ARINC routing of ACARS messages through remote ground stations. This type of premise is the equivalent of saying that when you call someone from your cell phone, you have the capability to choose which cell tower around the world you want your call to be routed. It's absurd. But for the sake of argument, we will explore this hypothesis.
Dispatch Operations Centers monitor flight tracking of the aircraft in near real time on an Airspace Situational Display (ASD). The United Airlines ASD is refreshed every 60 seconds according to another Memorandum For The Record released by the 9/11 Commission(4)

When asked about the technical capabilities of the ASD (airspace situational display) program used by the dispatchers on their monitors to track planes, all United representatives conferred that the program's display refreshes every 60 seconds.
.....
McCurdy recollected that at the time of the crash into tower 2, the display on Ballenger's monitor still showed UAL 175 at 31,000 ft, having just deviated from the normal flight plan and heading into a big turn back east.

The reason Dispatchers have an ASD is due to the fact the aircraft across the globe deviate from their cleared flight plans daily due to weather, traffic, etc. With an ASD, Dispatchers can keep track of their flights and alert for weather (or other adverse conditions) along the route. Even if Dispatchers had the capability to choose which specific ground station to route a message, why would they choose MDT and then later PIT if the aircraft is diverting back to the east on their monitors? The answer is, they wouldn't. The hypothesis that Remote Ground Station routing is based on original flight plan is completely absurd and usually attempted by only those who obviously are not interested in the facts, instead need to speculate to hold onto their beliefs. As described, the Central Processing System routes messages through remote ground stations based on Flight Tracking Protocol(5).
These are the ACARS remote ground station locations as compared with the flight path of United 175, including the diversion from the flight planned route due to the alleged "hijacking". An overlay of the RADES Radar data, also provided through FOIA, has been included to show the location of the Target Aircraft (TA) for the time when the first message was sent through Harrisburg. PA (MDT) and received by the aircraft, at 08:59:AM.

"Converged with Target Aircraft" radar track showing where the tracks actually converge with "UA175" can be viewed in 9/11 Intercepted, or here based on the RADES Radar Data provided through FOIA
(Click Image To Enlarge)

.

Distances from the Target Aircraft to the relative Remote Ground Stations (RGS) are included.

As you can see, there are many stations surrounding the Target Aircraft which are much closer to the aircraft than MDT out in Harrisburg, PA. Twelve stations to be exact,

1. ABE
2. EWR
3. MMU
4. JFK
5. LGA
6. TEB
7. PHL
8. HPN
9. ISP
10. ILG
11. ACY
12. AVP

All of which are nearly half the distance to the Target Aircraft than MDT is presently at 08:59 AM.
There is no possible reason for the Central Processing System (CPS) to have chosen MDT for routing purposes based on Flight Tracking protocol described above, if this Target Aircraft truly were United Flight 175, N612UA. The twelve other stations would have had to been skipped over, and for some reason the CPS chose MDT way out in Pennsylvania. Another argument (read: speculation) is that all those other stations were "congested" at the time which is why the CPS chose MDT. First, in order for this to be true, all those stations would have to be "congested" at least four times over. As demonstrated by the MFR referenced above, as many as 4 messages were routed through MDT. What are the odds that all 12 ground stations were "congested" each and every time? This argument, if not absurd, is moot as when the CPS determines the best ground station based on flight tracking protocol, the message is placed into a queue routed through the best station and then sent in the order it was received. ACARS messages are not very large in terms of bytes. Multiple messages can be sent in less than a second. It is logical to queue the messages at a remote ground station which is closer to the aircraft than to route a message through a ground station much further away in which the aircraft may not receive based on distance and altitude. Ground stations can send messages up to 200 miles, but this is only guaranteed if the aircraft is above 29,000 feet, as stated in the MFR sourced above.
When asked how the ACARS network chooses a Remote Ground Station for routing messages to an aircraft, FDR, Radar, ACARS Expert and Electrical Engineer Dennis Cimino had this to say,

The aircraft are constantly in contact with whatever ground station is nearest to it, more or less in 'data link' mode, sending acknowledgements back and forth. In cases where multiple stations on the ground are within range, the dropped packet numbers decide which ground station gets the priority. not as sophisticated as N.T.D.S. (naval tactical data systems) but pretty close to that.
On a more 'system' level, the ground stations are more or less in spread spectrum constant transmit mode like cell phones now use, so they won't step on each other continually. when an aircraft receiver's MDS (minimum discernible signal) sensitivity is achieved or reached out of the 'tangential' noise floor level, the aircraft's receiver then begins to try to data frame sync with the ground. then once that happens and two way 'ping pong' as data link persons refer to it, happens, then any queued messages get shipped to the receiving system and data relative to the aircraft's flight get sent back down to the ground.

This corroborates the Flight Tracking Protocol as outlined above based on a July 2002 Newsletter published by ARINC titled The Global Link(5).
Now that it is understood there were many ground stations which should have been chosen by the CPS before routing messages through MDT, why would the Central Processing System ever choose PIT as the next ground station for routing purposes if the aircraft was being tracked by the ACARS network to NYC? The answer is, it wouldn't.
It is possible all messages can be fabricated, but that would attract multiple felony charges as well considering the information was provided through the Freedom Of Information Act and used as evidence to support the claims made by the 9/11 Commission. Pilots For 9/11 Truth encourage readers to contact an ARINC Specialist in your area to confirm or refute the above evidence offered. Contact information for an ARINC office near you can be located through a simple google search. Feel free to direct them to this site and article.
Based on Flight Tracking protocol, the only reason the Central Processing System would choose to route messages through the ground stations located at MDT, then later PIT, over the numerous ground stations much closer and surrounding NYC, is due to the aircraft being in the vicinity of MDT, and then later, PIT. This means that the aircraft observed to strike the south tower, was not United 175.

"Converging Aircraft " radar tracks showing the targets converging can be viewed in
9/11 Intercepted, or here based on the RADES Radar Data provided through FOIA
(Click Image To Enlarge)

All aircraft converging above can be viewed in the RADES Data or 9/11: Intercepted

This evidence strengthens previous evidence uncovered by Pilots For 9/11 Truth that a standard 767 cannot remain in control, stable or hold together at the speeds reported by the NTSB for the South Tower aircraft(6). So, if UA175 was somewhere out in Pennsylvania when an aircraft was observed to strike the south tower, and a standard 767 cannot perform at such excessive speeds as reported, then where did the airplane come from which was observed to strike the South Tower? That is a great question and the reason we are still here after 10 years attempting to get answers for the day that changed our world, and will never go away until those questions are answered.
Send this evidence to your Congress Representative, your Senators, Judges, Lawyers, print it out and hand it to your pilots when boarding a flight (Pilots love reading material while in cruise). Call into talk shows, tell them about this evidence. Grab our DVD's and make copies, hand them to friends, family, co-workers, etc. Demand a new investigation into the events of 9/11. The 9/11 Families, The 9/11 Victims, The American People, The World, deserves to know Truth about what happened on September, 11, 2001.
Founded in August 2006, Pilots For 9/11 Truth is a growing organization of aviation professionals from around the globe. The organization has analyzed Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) for the Pentagon Attack, the events in Shanksville, PA and the World Trade Center Attack along with other information provided by several government agencies through the Freedom Of Information Act. The data does not support what we have been told. Government Agencies refuse to comment. Pilots For 9/11 Truth do not offer theory or point blame at this point in time. However, there is a growing mountain of conflicting information and data in which government agencies and officials refuse to acknowledge. Pilots For 9/11 Truth continues to grow and exist only through your continued support. We thank you!
http://pilotsfor911truth.org/core.html for full member list.
http://pilotsfor911truth.org/join to join.
http://pilotsfor911truth.org/store to help support Pilots For 9/11 Truth continued operations and research.
(1) http://pilotsfor911truth.org/acars/T..._UAL_ACARS.pdf - 12.9mb pdf
(2) http://pilotsfor911truth.org/acars/t...1MFR-01090.pdf (bottom of page 6) - 1.3mb pdf
(3) http://pilotsfor911truth.org/acars/Miles_Kara_MFR.pdf - 681kb pdf
(4) http://pilotsfor911truth.org/acars/m...-track-asd.pdf - 900kb pdf
(5) http://pilotsfor911truth.org/acars/GLOBAL_LINK.pdf - 174kb pdf
(6) 9/11: Speeds Reported For World Trade Center Attack Aircraft Analyzed - http://pilotsfor911truth.org/wtc_speed

**Peter Lemkin** · 12-02-2011 09:08 PM

9/11: Speeds Reported For World Trade Center Attack Aircraft Analyzed
For Immediate Release

(PilotsFor911Truth.org) - Much controversy has surrounded the speeds reported for the World Trade Center attack aircraft. However, none of the arguments for either side of the debate have been properly based on actual data, until now. Pilots For 9/11 Truth have recently analyzed data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board in terms of a "Radar Data Impact Speed Study" in which the NTSB concludes 510 knots and 430 knots for United 175 (South Tower) and American 11 (North Tower), respectively. A benchmark has been set by the October 1999 crash of Egypt Air 990, a 767 which exceeded it's maximum operating limits causing in-flight structural failure, of which data is available to compare to the WTC Attack Aircraft.

Egypt Air 990 (EA990) is a 767 which was reported to have entered a dive and accelerated to a peak speed of .99 Mach at 22,000 feet. Boeing sets maximum operating speeds for the 767 as 360 Knots and .86 Mach. The reason for two airspeed limitations is due to air density at lower vs. higher altitudes. To understand equivalent dynamic pressures on an airframe of low vs. high altitude, there is an airspeed appropriately titled "Equivalent Airspeed" or EAS[1]. EAS is defined as the airspeed at sea level which produces the same dynamic pressure acting on the airframe as the true airspeed at high altitudes.[2]

Pilots For 9/11 Truth have calculated the Equivalent Airspeed for EA990 peak speed of .99 Mach at 22,000 feet as the equivalent dynamic effects of 425 knots at or near sea level. This airspeed is 65 knots over max operating for a 767, 85 knots less than the alleged United 175, and 5 knots less than the alleged American 11. Although it may be probable for the alleged American 11 to achieve such speed as 430 knots is only 5 knots over that of EA990 peak speed, It is impossible for the alleged United 175 to achieve the speeds reported by the NTSB using EA990 as a benchmark.

Pilots For 9/11 Truth have further studied if a 767 could continue controlled flight at such reported speeds. According to the NTSB, EA990 wreckage was found in two distinct debris fields, indicating in-flight structural failure which has been determined to have occurred a few seconds after recording peak speed. Based on EA990, it is impossible for the alleged United 175 to have continued controlled flight at more than 85 knots over the speed which failed the structure of EA990.

Full detailed analysis, including analysis of a recent simulator experiment performed, and interviews with United and American Airlines 757/767 Pilots can be viewed in the new presentation, "9/11: World Trade Center Attack" available only at http://pilotsfor911truth.org. Although other factors come into play within the transonic ranges, Dynamic pressure is dynamic pressure. Math doesn't lie. Boeing needs to release wind tunnel data for the Boeing 767. Despite the fact that the data can be fabricated, such a release of data may alert more pilots and engineers to the extremely excessive speeds reported near sea level for the Boeing 767 in which they can decide for themselves. Update: Since our article on WTC Aircraft Speed Analysis was written, more evidence has been gathered to reflect the research provided by Pilots For 9/11 Truth and in the film "9/11: World Trade Center Attack". A more thorough understanding and explanation of why V speeds are established based on wind tunnel tests performed by the manufacturer is also available virtually making the need to gather documents from Boeing based on wind tunnel testing, moot. We already have their results of such tests in the form of the V Speeds they have established through wind tunnel testing required by definition as outlined in the Illustrated Guide To Aerodynamics and all other related text. For more information and to review the evidence gathered, click here.

Founded in August 2006, Pilots For 9/11 Truth is a growing organization of aviation professionals from around the globe. The organization has also analyzed Flight Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) for the Pentagon Attack and the events in Shanksville, PA. The data does not support the government story. The NTSB/FBI refuse to comment. Pilots For 9/11 Truth do not offer theory or point blame at this point in time. However, there is a growing mountain of conflicting information and data in which government agencies and officials refuse to acknowledge. Pilots For 9/11 Truth Core member list continues to grow.

http://pilotsfor911truth.org/core.html for full member list.

http://pilotsfor911truth.org/join to join.

Comments? Discuss here.

[1] http://www.luizmonteiro.com/Altimetr...valentAirspeed, http://www.csgnetwork.com/machonecalc.html (Equivalent Airspeed and Mach One Calculator to convert Mach into True Airspeed based on altitude/temp and then into Equivalent Airspeed)
[2] http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question...ts/q0251.shtml

**Peter Lemkin** · 12-03-2011 06:52 AM

Just in case you need some evidence that some 911 'truth' websites contain the truth from being spoken[certain evidence from even being discussed]; on this very topic:

http://pilotsfor911truth.org/forum/i...howtopic=21593

**Peter Lemkin** · 12-03-2011 06:58 AM

http://www.911woodybox.blogspot.com/

The Cleveland Airport Shell Game: Delta 1989, Delta 1898, United 1898
The Cleveland Airport Shell Game: Delta 1989, Delta 1898, United 189808/21/2011 08:55 PM

This short piece is an update of my most popular article so far, "The Cleveland Airport Mystery" from 2004, prominently featured in "Crossing the Rubicon" by Michael Ruppert and "Loose Change, 2. edition" by Dylan Avery.

I examined the circumstances of the landing of Delta 1989, a Boeing 767 out of Boston, at Cleveland Hopkins Airport on 9/11. I was lucky to find so much evidence for the existence of a shadowy doppelganger flight of Delta 1989 - landing at about the same time and likewise being evacuated - that I published the results here.

Unfortunately, many people think the central thesis of the article is that United 93 was the mysterious plane that landed at Cleveland Airport. This ist not true. I never claimed that United 93 landed at Cleveland. For more background, look here.

I claimed, however, and do continue to claim that an unidentified Boeing 767 landed at Cleveland in emergency and was evacuated, with Delta 1989 serving as a cover, i. e. whoever asked for the identity of the mysterious plane afterwards reaped the answer: that was Delta 1989! and stopped asking questions.

In 2009, numerous documents of the 9/11 Commission came to light. There I found a perfect candidate for the eerie double of Delta 1989 - United 1898 - and published it here.

In summary, United 1898 is a most interesting case because Cleveland controllers reported it to a special unit of the FAA, named "AAT-200", which is dealing with accidents, emergency cases and other irregularities. However, on 9/11/2001 United Airlines operated no aircraft with flight number 1898. Together with the salient similarity of the flight number (1989/1898) this makes United 1898 a good candidate for "Flight X" and an interesting matter of investigation.

Two years later, I'm now proud to present an independent verification for the emergency landing of a Flight 1898 at Cleveland. This time it's called Delta 1898.

1009 DAL1989 on downwind at CLE

1024 DAL1989 on ground CLE

1035 Unconfirmed report - DAL1989 flaps up at CLE

1039 DAL1989 parked in secure area/no one exited a/c yet (pilot says he is not being hijacked)

1116 DAL 1898 confirmed by security HIJACK at CLE ATC - communication with pilot does not confirm

1119 DAL 1989 still not suspected hijack; taxiing to terminal

Source

In this internal FAA timeline, there is only one entry for DAL1898. Note that this is definitely no typo because DAL1898 was a confirmed hijacking, whereas DAL1989 (= Delta 1989) was never suspected a hijack, neither earlier nor later than the security warning of Delta 1898. It should be of no big surprise by now that this so-called Delta 1898 was not the official Delta Flight 1898 who was scheduled to depart from Salt Lake City in the afternoon, but - of course - never left the ground on that day.

So United 1898 and Delta 1898 were both fake flight numbers. The identity of the numbers and the similar context (United 1898 was an emergency case; Delta 1898 was a confirmed hijacking) leads straightforwardly to the conclusion that these two planes were one and the same. The close similarity of the flight numbers 1898 and 1989 corroborates the thesis that Delta 1989 functioned as a cover-up for Flight 1898. The plane was probably evacuated as United 1898, was quickly renamed Delta 1898, and fell into oblivion due to the informational cover provided by Delta 1989.

This very much reminds a shell game, with the shells bearing fake flight numbers. And the only entity entitled to legally use fake flight numbers was the military in case of conducting a war game, i.e. an exercise. It appears that the emergency landing of Flight 1898 and its subsequent evacuation was indeed part of a military exercise. This may be the reason why it's so difficult to obtain information about the incident: military secrecy.

Combined with the information already presented in my original article, there is now ample evidence that Flight 1898 was a Boeing 767 of United Airlines coming from Boston - but it was not the regular United 1898. The number of the United Boeing 767's departing from Boston is so small that it should narrow down the search for the identity of the mysterious plane considerably. United 177 looks like a good candidate.

Was Mohamed Atta being employed by American Airlines?05/29/2011 03:54 PM

Diane Graney is the second witness (besides Lynn Howland whom I presented in my last blog entry) with precise recollections of Mohamed Atta, but completely ignored by the 9/11 Commission. Graney worked at Portland Airport on 9/11. She didn't see the alleged hijackers Atta and Al-Omari, but recognized Atta's face from the photo that was published in the aftermath. She is positive that Atta, dressed in an American Airlines uniform and able to identify himself as an AA pilot, tried prior to 9/11 to achieve a jump seat on a US Airways flight.

Compare this to the particulars provided by Lynn Howland. According to her, Atta was "wearing a white pilot type or oxford shirt, no tie and blue pilot type slacks" and carried a "really cheap pilot bag". Furthermore, Atta approached her and asked if she was going to fly American 11. Apparently he wanted to jump seat the flight.

Here is a list of persons who occasionally are allowed to take a jump seat in the cockpit (from Wikipedia): In aircraft, jump seats - which are officially termed auxiliary crew stations - can be located in cockpits or passenger cabins. In cockpits, jump seats are provided for individuals who are not operating the aircraft. These might include trainee pilots, off-duty crew members in transition to another airport (see deadheading), government officials (such as Federal Aviation Administration staff), or airline staff.

There are also witnesses in Florida confirming that Atta boasted about his status as an American Airlines pilot. Yet the 9/11 Commission has completely blacked out the accounts of Lynn Howland and Diane Graney and missed to pursue their hints that Atta presented himself on several occasions as an AA pilot in order to jump seat a certain flight.

Was American Airlines aware about Atta's activities? And why has the 9/11 Commission failed to follow this important trace?

Here is Diane Graney's account (date: 9/22/01):

Diane Graney, date of birth ........... employed as a Customer Service Agent CSA and Ground Security Coordinator GSC, U.S. Airways USAIR, Portland International Jetport, 1001 Westbrook Street, Portand, Maine, telephone number 207775-5210, was interviewed at her place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, she provided the following information:

Graney has been employed with USAIR for approximately twelve years. As a CSA for USAIR, Graney's duties include conducting passenger check-ins, checking baggage, making seat assignments, and issuing tickets. She performs her duties at either the USAIR Ticket Counter or at the individual airport gates. As a GSC, she deals with aircraft, airport, and general security issues.

On September 11, 2001, from 5:00 AM to 1:00 PM, Graney was working at the USAIR ticket counter. At some point in her shift she heard of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, and that one of the flights was American Airlines Flight 11 out of Logan Airport in Boston. As a GSC, she went and pulled the passenger lists for the US AIR flights to Logan to see if any USAIR passengers had a connection to thje flight. Graney saw that there were two passengers on USAIR Flight 5930 to Logan that had a connection to American Airlines Flight 11. The two names were Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari. She also noticed the two were to sit in First Class on American Airlines Flight 11. Graney thought it was suspicious that these two passengers could have taken a better, more direct flight then what they had scheduled.

Graney observed that Atta and Alomari had checked two bags in at the US AIR Ticket Counter, and that Michael Tuohey was the CSA who checked them in. She spoke to Tuohey about the two passengers, and he advised her of what he had observed. She then contacted Chuck Severance, US AIR Station Manager, and informed him of what happened and what she had discovered.

Graney advised that later when she saw Atta's picture on the news, she believed she had seen him before. She thought he may have tried to jump seat once with USAIR, and he was in uniform using an American Airlines pilot identification. She believed that this happened within the last six months. She advised she searched the USAIR jump seat peaperwork to see who had gone through for June 2001, July 2001, and August 2001, but was unable to find Atta's name. She advised the jump seat forms are only kept for 90 days. She became more concerned about this when she heard on the news that some American Airlines uniforms were stolen in Italy.

Graney was then requested to review a photograph array containing twelve pictures of twelve of the alleged hijackers. Graney identified the picture of Mohamed Atta as the person she remembered seeing prior to September 11, 2001 attempting to jump seat a USAIR flight. She also identified the picture of Marwan Alshehhi as someone she had seen sometime at the airport ticket counter. She identified the picture of Waleed Alshehri as someone who looks familiar. Both Graney and the interviewing agent dated and initialed the pictures she identified.A pilot's strange encounter with Atta at Boston Airport04/24/2011 03:48 PM

The following is the official paraphrased statement of an American Airlines pilot, interviewed by the FBI on October 13th, 2001. The witness describes how she was shortly approached by Mohammed Atta inside the AA terminal at Logan Airport. Her account is detailed, credible, and intriguing.

Lynn Marie Florence Howland, First Officer, American Airlines, AA, was interviewed near her home at a Starbucks Café in ................... She was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and nature of the interview. For identification, she advised that she lives and .............................. and has been with American Airlines for eleven years.

Howland explained to the interviewing agent that she has been out of state for several days flying in her job. To assist her recollection she prepared a type written one page chronology of the events regarding the encounter with a person she thought was the suspected hijacker of AA Flight 11 on the morning of September 11, 2001. She advised that she was extremely tired after her flight. She left her home at approximately 10:00 a.m. all times local on the morning of September 10th, flew down to San Francisco to then fly as first officer for the AA red-eye flight from San Francisco to Boston. Checking a dispatch schedule, she indicated she flew AA flight 198 from San Francisco, California to Boston, Massachusetts. She indicated the flight had a 9:50 p.m. departure, with arrival at Logan Airport, Boston at approximately 6:50 a.m. on the morning of September 11th. The equipment was a Boeing 767. She advised that the captain was Douglas Balmain. She was sure that the arrival gate for her flight 198 was Bravo 33. Subsequently she checked with AA dispatch and was told her flight AA 198 became the hijacked AA flight 11.

After almost everyone had deplaned, she went up the jetway ahead of Captain Balmain. She stated as she was standing near the entrance to the jetway, in the passenger lounge, a male individual comes up to her suddenly and asks if she is going to take this plane out, referring to the flight she just brought in. She said no and he abruptly turned and went and sat down. She thought that was extremely rude. Her first impression was that he was a pilot going to fly in the jump seat. While he wasn't in uniform, he may have been wearing a pilot type shirt, open collar. She thought he may have had a rolling pilot flight kit or bag with him, which she described as black vinyl, round top, and incredibly cheap. Again she could not recall anything else, only at that time wanting to get to the hotel and sleep. She said she was so tired, when she got to her hotel room she crashed in bed, in her uniform. She woke up about one p.m. and then found out about the terrorist attacks. She said for the longest time she wasn't even sure that she was dreaming it all, until she saw photographs of the hijackers in the news, she was instantly sure that the indivdual she saw that morning was the suspected hijacker, Mohammed Atta. She added that when she first saw the pictures of the hijackers in the new media, it was like an electric shock when she saw the picture of Atta.

She described the individual she saw that morning as having dark hair, dark eyes and being approximately five feet, eight inches in height. Because she was so tired and just wanted to get to the hotel, she could not recall much, other than he may have had that cheap pilot flight bag. She could not recall anything else and stated that time she had no reason to notice. She did not think that Captain Balmain would have noticed him. As she explained in her notes, the recollection .... (??? - missing text) She was shown a photo spread of six males and instantly chose number 5, which is the terrorist described as Mohammed Atta. She then signed and dated the photo spread under photograph number five. She said that her selection was based totally on her recollection of the morning of September 11th and not from any subsequent photographs she may have seen in the news.

The following are Howland's notes, prepared prior to the interview and scanned directly into this FD-302 and corrected only for scanning errors:

"Flew flight 198 SF-BOS
Departed September 10
Arrived September 11
On the ground approximately 0650 EST
In gate probably at 0700 EST
I left the cockpit first and waited for the captain at the top of the jetbridge in the boarding area.
He was slower maybe 5-7 minutes behind me.
We went to the hotel. I went to sleep called my parents at 1300 EST and they told me what happened.
Later that day I realized it was the aircraft that I had brought in.
That is what I remembered until I saw the photos on TV.
I was instantly sure I have seen Mohammed Atta before could not remember where.

Two days later I was driving my car in at night in the rain and my thoughts were drifting to the horrible loss. I suddenly had a memory of a man approaching me and asking me if I was taking the flight out. I was stunned. Did this really happen? I thought about it some more and remembered Mohammed Atta approaching me and asking me if I was taking flight 11 out. I said "No, I just brought the aircraft in." He turned his back and abruptly walked away and I was a little annoyed with his rudeness but as it was 0400 body clock time I let it go and told myself that people are rude everyday.

This would have been between 0700 and 0720 EST. I think he was wearing a white pilot type or oxford shirt, no tie and blue pilot type slacks. I am unsure about the shirt but perhaps that was what the man he sat down next to was wearing. I also remember him having a really cheap pilot bag. The vinyl one with a rounded top with black plastic squares at the corners.

I spent 2 days trying to decide of this was a true memory and decided it was. I have decided to share this because I felt it was my civic duty."http://www.scribd.com/doc/14094195/T7-B11-FBI-302s-Cockpit-and-American-and-Hijacker-Fdr-FBI-302-S-Entire-Contents

This statement creates a huge problem for the official Atta story: According to the BTS database and other sources, it was about 6:00 a.m. EDT when Flight 198 arrived at the gate, not 7:00 EST. (This is a minor mistake of West Coast resident Lynn Howland and in no way damages the accuracy of her other recollections.) Just at this time, a man identifying himself as Mohammed Atta boarded a Colgan Air flight in Portland, Maine, going to Boston. He did not arrive there before 6:45 EDT.

Conclusion: the "Mohammed Atta" whose face was presented on the news in the days after 9/11 and the "Mohammed Atta" in the blue shirt recorded by a security camera at Portland Airport are not the same person. This confirms the outstanding research of John Doe II who has collected plenty of evidence for the existence of - at least - one double of Atta:

http://johndoeii.blog.com/2011/03/29/mohammed-atta
Was Flight 11 a "real world exercise" ?03/07/2011 05:17 PM Source: Newhouse News

In an old Democratic Underground posting the esteemed colleague Shoestring expressed doubts about the customary interpretation of the term "real world" which pops up on the NEADS tapes a couple of times. Here's his quote in its entirety:

The quote of Major James Fox saying, "I've never seen so much real-world stuff happen during an exercise" is really suspicious. I wonder if the staff at NEADS understood "real-world" to mean a live-fly field training exercise, as opposed to a purely simulated command post exercise?
So when Sgt. Jeremy Powell asked Boston flight control center "Is this real-world or exercise?" he could have been asking if the exercise was live-fly or not. And when Boston replied "this is not an exercise, not a test," he took it to mean that it was indeed a live-fly exercise, involving a plane under the control of the military pretending to be hijacked.

This would certainly explain the bizarre conversation between the NEADS "ID techs —Stacia Rountree, Shelley Watson, and Maureen Dooley—when they heard of the reported hijacking:

8:37:56
WATSON: What?
DOOLEY: Whoa!
WATSON: What was that?
ROUNTREE: Is that real-world?
DOOLEY: Real-world hijack.
WATSON: Cool!

I find it hard to believe Shelley Watson would have responded, "Cool!" if she thought "Real-world hijack" did really mean a genuine hijacking. Might she instead have believed it to have meant a "live-fly," with a real plane pretending to be hijacked, for which they could launch fighers in response?
Shoestring surmises that the term "real world" indicates a "live-fly exercise" with real airborne planes as opposed to a "command post exercise" which is only played on the desks and screens of the participating military units. I agree with him that this interpretation is far more plausible than the official version (that "real world" meant an actual, genuine hijacking).

A statement of Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins of NEADS shows that Shoestring is right with his conjecture:

Deskins noted that NEADS had a hijack checklist and a variety of exercises depending on higher authority involvement and direction prior to 9/11. Some of those exercises involved NORAD coordination. She does not recall ever personally designing an exercise in which a decision would be made to shoot down the hij acked aircraft. A typical design would include course deviation in which the hijacker forces the pilot to fly to a designated landing point. They would not do these hijacks exercises real world. They had a cell that would play the FAA in the exercise. Deskins noted that there really were not the assets to do a large scale real world exercise to practice hijack response. The scenarios for the exercises are created by exercise designers in the exercise shop. Sgt. Mark Stanford and Sgt. Mike Quigley, both retired, designed the exercises when she was the head of the shop. NEADS' hijack shop would not design exercises for other sectors.

Exercises that are designed on the NORAD level are created at planning conferences. NORAD planning exercises are mostly held at Peterson, or at CONR at Tindle. There is intelligence representation at the conferences, but the sector shops are more concerned with the individual exercise of the sector floor and Battle Cab. She does not personally recall the design of a hijack with multiple hijacks or terrorist take over.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/19988140/M...e-103003-00778
For the first time, the term "real-world exercise" emerges here in the context of the 9/11 wargames, and according to Deskins, it means a voluminous large-scale exercise with the need to involve the FAA. In smaller (not "real-world" exercises) the FAA was not needed because NEADS had its own cell playing their role. A corollary of Deskins' statement is that real-world exercises were not designed by NEADS itself, but one level above, at NORAD planning conferences.

The reader can easily verify Shoestring's interpretation by searching for "real world exercise", maybe narrowed down with "air force" or "military". The output will quickly convince him that "real world exercise" is a common concept in the military world.

So whenever the term "real world" is used, it indicates that NEADS personnel are believing they are confronted with a large-scale, live-fly exercise with participation of the FAA. NEADS was prepared for these exercises, but not actual, genuine hijackings. It is not known how the air defense used to label such (very rare) genuine hijackings, but it was certainly not "real world" lest to confound it with the ongoing real world exercises.

Flight 11 was apparently viewed as a real-world exercise.

Was Flight 93 part of a military hijack exercise?11/23/2010 10:08 PMFAA delayed alerting of NEADS on the hijacking of Flight 93

Since 2002, when Jared Israel was the first one to point out the lame reaction of the US air defense to the hijackings (not being able to intercept leastwise one of the airliners), there's still no satisfying answer to the question for those who were responsible for the fatal delays.

The 9/11 Commission basically argues that the existing protocol for the collaboration between the FAA and NORAD in the case of a hijacking was "unsuited in every respect" because it was designed for "traditional hijackings" rather than suicide terrorists using hijacked planes as missiles. The Commission Report describes meticulously how the information "Flight X is hijacked" was ought to be processed from the basic FAA controller who spots the plane, upward the FAA hierarchy to the "hijack coordinator" who contacts the NMCC (National Military Command Center), and - after seeking approval from the Secretary of Defense - down the NORAD chain of command.

There is an entire section on this subject ("Interagency collaboration", p. 17/18), which is copied word by word from the Commission's Staff Statement No. 17, a working paper from June 2004, with one remarkable exception. The sentence "Most FAA centers had a civilian employee to coordinate with NORAD, for situations like training exercises", which is written down in the statement, didn't manage it into the final report.

It should have, however. On 9/11, these civilian employees, also known as "military liaisons", were in direct contact to the NEADS air defenders. So the regional FAA Centers were by all means able to shortcut the intricate protocol by simply telling their own military liaison to call up NEADS. And this is exactly what happened:

Flight............................................ ......11.........175.........77.........93
Controller realizes flight is hijacked.......8:25.......8:55.......----........9:32
Notification of NEADS.........................8:37.......9:03..... ..----.......10:07
Delay in minutes..................................12....... ....8..........----.........35

While 8 or 12 minutes look to be a reasonable time for controllers to figure out the situation, discuss various options and get clearance from higher-ranking FAA managers, the outstanding 35 minutes delay for Flight 93 requires a closer look at Cleveland Center, the facility responsible for Flight 93. (Flight 77 is a special case because it was not believed to be hijacked, but missed; it completely vanished from the radar scopes of FAA controllers.)

The "Flight 93 is a hijack with a bomb on board" information needed only two minutes from the basic controller to FAA headquarters:
At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency: "Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board." The controller understood, but chose to respond: "Calling Cleveland Center, you're unreadable. Say again, slowly." He notified his supervisor, who passed the notice up the chain of command. By 9:34, word of the hijacking had reached FAA headquarters. (911 CR, p. 28)
However: NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center at 10:07. We know his name from transcripts of NEADS radio messages: that was Mr. Dukelin - first name unknown. Dukelin was in direct contact to Stacia Rountree from NEADS, he spoke with her at 9:45 and again at 10:00. At both occasions, he alerted her to Delta 1989 - but not one single word on United 93.

Did Dukelin not know about the hijacking of Flight 93? This can be precluded. He was certainly in contact with the Traffic Management Unit and Ed Wolbers, the operations manager:
They are speaking to the pilot, Dukelin talks to Ed and tells him he is talking to HUNTRESS. Ed says D1989 is not being hijacked, he is landing as a precaution in Cleveland.So Dukelin, like the Cleveland Center management, was certainly aware of the Flight 93 problem. Maybe he was eagerly waiting for an order from above to inform NEADS:
Cleveland even told the Command Center [at 9:36] it was prepared to contact a nearby military base to make the request. The Command Center told Cleveland that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had to make the decision to seek military assistance and were working on the issue. (911 CR, p. 28/29)
But the upper FAA management shied away from requesting the help of NEADS:
At 9:49, 13 minutes after Cleveland Center had asked about getting military help, the Command Center suggested that someone at headquarters should decide whether to request military assistance:

FAA Headquarters: They're pulling Jeff away to go talk about United 93.
Command Center: Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?
FAA Headquarters: Oh, God, I don't know.
Command Center: Uh, that's a decision somebody's gonna have to make probably in the next ten minutes.
FAA Headquarters: Uh, ya know everybody just left the room.
(911 CR, p. 29)
Everybody left the room. The Headquarters and the Command Center were tracking Flight 93 as it turned around and headed toward Washington. They got the information that it was hijacked and had a bomb on board. They knew that two airliners had already been used as guided missiles - yet nobody of the leading FAA personnel bothered to follow Cleveland Center's suggestion and tell NEADS (via Dukelin) to scramble fighters. What was going on there?

Additionally, at 9:45 the FAA issued the general grounding order for all aircraft. Who ordered it? The official story has it that it was Ben Sliney, director of the Command Center, but there are also reports that it was Monte Belger, deputy director of the Headquarters - not to forget that Norman Mineta claims the glory for himself. No matter who was it - why did this hero make the risky, unprecedented, precautionary decision to "get all the birds down", but failed to make the acute, urgent, if well-rehearsed and operationally easy decision to alert NEADS about a hijacked airliner on his way to Washington with a bomb on board?

There seems to be only one realistic recourse: Flight 93 was part of a military exercise, probably a hijack simulation, and the exercise plot included a delayed alerting of NEADS. The behavior of Belger, Sliney & co. indicates that they didn't view the plane as a threat, but were told (possibly from the Secret Service who - according to Mike Ruppert - had direct access to FAA data) that it was a "special", i.e. a military exercise flight. The purpose of the delayed alert might have been to test NEADS - to make it more difficult for them to intercept the flight in time.

To substantiate this thesis, I take a look at the function of the so-called military liaisons. I've already mentioned that the 9/11 Commission describes their job as "to coordinate with NORAD, for situations like training exercises". An analysis paper from 2001, examining the structure of Air Traffic Control, confirms that the military liaisons dealt with exercises. Moreover it looks that the exercises were the only job of the liaisons.
Military Coordinator: coordinates paper work and flight data for all military exercises within Boston Center airspace.This certainly applies to the other FAA Centers as well. Also FAA directive 7610.4K ("Special Military Operations") shows up the central role of the military liaisons for the exercises:
FAA Military Liaison Officers’ Responsibilities

1−6−1. ACTIONS

Liaison officers shall take the following actions in connection with proposed military exercises:

a. Encourage mission planning officers to include assigned airspace requirements in the information disseminated with the request for exercise approval.

b. Recommend the use of planning conferences to mission planning officers for the resolution of problems when it is evident that the exercise requirements will generate sufficient traffic to create untenable air traffic or airspace user situations.c. Provide early notification and information to the affected ARTCCs and CARF on any exercises which are classified under subparagraph b.So by dropping the "military liaisons" from the final report, the Commission avoided questions about their function. Their function was to coordinate military exercises with civilian air traffic. It was not to assist the FAA in the case of a hijacking. Interestingly, there is an interview with the military liaison of Boston Center, Colin Scoggins (as his alias "Cheap Shot"):
As the military specialist I am responsible for all military procedures between Boston Center and the military units in my airspace, and any visiting military units that participate in any of our Special Use Airspace (SUA).http://sites.google.com/site/911guide/cs
Q: What can you tell about the military exercises of that day, and if they had any effect whatsoever on the response?

Cheap Shot: I never knew anything about them. Vigilant Guardian is an exercise that we don’t participate at Boston Center. We normally are involved in Fertile Spades, Fertile Angels, and Amalgam Virgo’s. Occasionally we will get involved in large-scale exercises such as a while back Amalgam Warrior, and Global Yankee.
http://sites.google.com/site/911guide/cs3

"Cheap Shot" denies any knowledge of or involvement in the ongoing exercises. This comes as a big surprise, because NORAD was conducting several large-scale exercises, Vigilant Guardian being only one of them. Other exercises, not mentioned by Scoggins, were Global Guardian, Northern Guardian, or Vigilant Warrior. NORAD covers the entire airspace of Boston Center. When Boston Center called NEADS, the air defenders thought it was the begin of Vigilant Guardian. Scoggins' "I never knew" claim would imply that NORAD conducted its exercises in Boston Center airspace without any coordination with civilian air traffic control - bypassing Scoggins, the scheduled coordinator.

This is hard to believe and entails the search for an alternative explanation. Here is one: Scoggins was involved in the exercises, but to admit this fact would have opened the doors for more gnawing questions. Many suspect Scoggins of being a gatekeeper, and the job of a gatekeeper is to absorb dangerous questions. This is exactly what he's doing.

A military liaison was not only assigned to the FAA field facilities, but to the Command Center and the Headquarters, too. There is little information available for the latter. The military liaison at the Command Center was the "Air Traffic Services Cell", consisting of Col. John Czabaranek, Lt. Col. Michael-Anne Cherry and Maj. Kevin Bridges. Mike Williams of 911myths.com speculates that the job of the "cell" on 9/11 was to help with the communication infrastructure (teleconferences etc.):
From this description the cell officers earliest task appears to have been to set up the various teleconferences. They were assisting with communications in general, and there's nothing here to say the officers would take it upon themselves to monitor FAA information and pass it on to NORAD, especially if they believed (like Sliney) NORAD had already been informed. It wasn't their job, and they had other things to do.Other sources suggest, however, that the task of the Air Traffic Services Cell was to coordinate civilian with military aircraft movement, like their counterparts at the field facilities:
Military Air Traffic Services Cell
–Housed within the System Command Center
–Mission -To coordinate all priority military aircraft movement and airspace issues during times of tension, warfare, natural disasters or civil unrest.
–Warfare Support
–Deployment of forces
–Sensitive, specialized, or classified mission coordination
–Military training exercise support
–Natural or environmental disaster assistance
–Civil exercise collaboration involving military participation
On 9/11, there was no tension, warfare, natural disaster or civil unrest, leaving the "military training exercise support" as the residual task of the "cell". This is confirmed by an article of Aviation Week & Space Technology from December 2001, describing the job of the cell as "refresher training", i.e. conducting exercises:
In a fluke, so was what Herndon calls "the military cell"--the Air Traffic Services Cell, created by the FAA and the Defense Dept. for use when needed to coordinate priority aircraft movement during warfare or emergencies. The Pentagon staffs it only three days per month for refresher training, but Sept. 11 happened to be one of those days.It is unclear if the Air Traffic Services Cell was in direct contact to the military liaisons at the FAA field facilities, but there is reason to assume that. The cell was able to communicate with other military facilities via SIPRNET, the military's Internet:
The ATSC’s response to the terrorist attacks benefits from the fact that, six weeks earlier, the cell had a secure terminal to access the SIPRNET—the military’s classified version of the Internet—installed, along with other hardware, which significantly enhances the movement of vital information. According to Meenan, because the cell has the SIPRNET terminal, “we could immediately look at NORAD and [Defense Department] plans as they evolved; filter, package, and format them, then walk out to the [FAA] national operations manager—who had control of the entire national airspace system—and give him current visibility into… fighter, tanker, and support aircraft activities. It cut down our response time tremendously.”http://web.archive.org/web/200209130...20610/aw52.htm

The last sentence - "it cut down our response time tremendously" - deserves only scorn and derision, considering the 35-minute delay of alerting NEADS to Flight 93. Instead, SIPRNET seems to have been the central tool to conduct the various exercises. Moreover, it was a valuable tool for "interested circles" to make the exercises a springboard for performing the 9/11 crimes.Source of the Delta 1989 hijack rumor: the FAA teleconference10/11/2010 10:24 PM
The FAA Command Center (source:caasd.org)

Why indeed was Delta 1989 believed to be hijacked? And who was the source for this misinformation? The answers appear to change everytime when a new report on the aircraft is published.

According to USA Today (2002), the FBI was the source. Delta 1989 simply fit the "hijack profile" of American 11 and United 175 (i.e. a Boeing 767 from Boston going from East Coast to West Coast).

http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/...r-daytwo_x.htm

The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) mentions the same reason (the hijack profile), but identifies Boston Center as the source. Just recently, Commission staffer Miles Kara has repeated this version.

http://www.oredigger61.org/?cat=18

But Colin Scoggins, the controller from Boston Center who called NEADS to warn them about Delta 1989, explains in an interview from 2007 that the plane became suspicious because it missed a frequency transfer from Boston Center to Cleveland Center:

http://sites.google.com/site/911guide/cs2

Lynn Spencer ("Touching History", 2008) also mentions a failed frequency transfer, but this time within Cleveland Center (i.e. from sector to sector).

http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2009...mation-on.html

Something doesn't add up here.

But here's a document that expels all of these accounts into the land of hearsay. It's the written account of Colin Scoggins, the said Boston Center controller, from 9/20/2001. According to Scoggins, it was the FAA Open Teleconference which was established by the Command Center after Flight 11 was reported being hijacked:

Open TELCON reports that DAL1889 is NORDO in ZOB airspace. ASD indicates aircraft is near Cleveland.Call NEADS to advise of DAL1889, possible hijack.http://www.scribd.com/doc/13950342/T...it-Union-First

In plain language: One participant of the teleconference reported that Delta 1989 (Scoggins remembered the flight number incorrectly) had lost radio contact while flying over Cleveland.

Here are three annotations to this surprising message:

1 - Delta 1989 was never out of radio contact, i.e. the message is flagrant misinformation.

2 - it's Scoggins 2001 vs. Scoggins 2007; when determining which account is more reliable, just look at the date. Memories use to be more accurate after nine days than after six years.

3 - who participated on the teleconference? At least the FAA Command Center and the three facilities Boston Center, New York Center and Cleveland Center, if we follow the 9/11 Commission. Cleveland Center was in continous contact with Delta 1989, Boston Center and New York Center were not responsible for Cleveland Center airspace. Therefore these three facilities are out of the question when it comes to the source of the misinformation.

Is there any reason that someone at the Command Center spreaded misinformation on the teleconference? Just note that Scoggins was not a regular air traffic controller, but the military liaison at Boston Center, and that there was a military liaison (or military cell) at the Command Center, too, who also participated in various teleconferences. This needs further research.

The passengers of Flight 11 embarked on the wrong plane: CONFIRMED09/17/2010 08:35 PM
Memorial flag at Gate 32, Boston Logan Airport, Terminal B, American Airlines (Source: patrickmadrid.blogspot.com)

When did the passengers of Flight 11 embark on the plane? After nine years, this seemingly easy question is still lacking an answer. The 9/11 Commission Report doesn't deliver one, instead it confronts us with surprising boarding data: See TSA report, "Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers," undated. For boarding and seating information, see AAL record, SABRE information on Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001. These boarding times from the American system are approximate only; for flight 11 they indicated that some passengers boarded after the aircraft had pushed back from the gate. See AAL response to the Commission's February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004. (9/11 Commisson Report, note #9 of Chapter 1)It is, of course, impossible that any passenger boarded Flight 11 after it had moved off the gate. The concise explanation of the Commission: the boarding times are "approximate only". This sounds like as if the actual boarding times were spaciously rounded up by American Airlines' SABRE system which records and processes the boarding data.

Example: Given that Flight 11 pushed back at 7:40*** (see appendix). Now the Commission claims: if a passenger passed the gate at 7:37 (before the push-back), the system logged his boarding time as 7:50 (or 8:00 or whatever time after the push-back). This sizeable time gap smells funny and shows that the Commission's explanation for the oddity is concise, but far from conclusive. And indeed it doesn't withstand a closer scrutiny.

The cited note indicates that the Commission sent a request to American Airlines on February 3, 2004, which was answered at March 15, 2004. In 2009, this response was released to the public. American previously has provided the Commission with documents that indicate the approximate times that passengers boarded AA Flights 11 and 77 and the approximate check-in times at the main ticket counters at the respective airports. These documents are Kean Commission Bates numbers 004658-004675 (Flight 77) and 004483-004518 (Flight 11) and are from American's Electronic Gate Reader ("EGR") records. The EGR records do not provide the exact time of individual passenger check-in, the check-in location (ticket counter vs. departure gate), or the identification of the check-in agent.

The EGR system for a particular flight is manually initiated by the gate agent usually several hours prior to boarding. The initation of the EGR system is done at the discretion of the gate agent. At initiation, the system downloads information for the flight, such as the names of all passengers holding reservations, check in status, seat assignment (if pre-reserved), booking class, and destination city.

Following system initation, the EGR system "polls" the Sabre passenger reservation system for any updates to this data. Prior to the start of boarding, the updates occur at approximately 15-minute intervals and provide a "snapshot" of any changes in information since the last update. For this reason, the ticket counter check-in times from the EGR system reflect only "approximate" times. During actual boarding of the flights, the "polling" process occurs more frequently, at approximately 15-second intervals. The EGR records the time that a passenger's boarding pass goes through the EGR and, provides an accurate record of when the passenger boards the aircraft.

http://www.911myths.com/index.php/Im...-Responses.pdf So the boarding times are recorded fairly accurate, with an uncertainty of +-15 seconds. In our example: if a passenger passed the gate at 7:37:48, the system might round up the time to 7:37:50 or 7:38:00, but certainly not a time after 7:40 (the push-back). While the system checks the passenger's reservation status every 15 minutes only, it doesn't create minute-long gaps between actual and recorded boarding time.

The 9/11 Commissioners ignore this difference. Why does their report insinuate that the inaccurate boarding times are inherent in the SABRE system if American Airlines declares in plain language that the system "provides an accurate record of when the passenger boards the aircraft"? Either the gentlemen did not read AA's answer (?), or didn't understand it (???), or they decided to cease further inquiries and try to get away with a half-baked explanation ("approximate only"). An internal working draft from May 2004 shows that likely the latter is the case: At 7:31 a.m. Wail Al-Shehri and Waleed Al-Shehri boarded American Flight #11. At 7:39 a.m. Atta and al Omari embarked on the aircraft and al Suqami boarded at 7:40 a.m. (PLACEHOLDER: THESE TIMES, WHICH ARE PULLED FROM AA'S SABRE RESPONSE SYSTEM, NEED FURTHER VERIFICATION BECAUSE THAT REPORT HAS SOME OTHER PASSENGERS "BOARDING" AFTER THE FLIGHT HAD PUSHED BACK).

http://www.scribd.com/doc/15121435/F...ptember-11-166 The doubtfullness and need for further inquiry expressed in this paper is not reflected in the Commission report at all which was released three months later. The (too) late boarding is confirmed by two passengers of Flight 11 (Albert Filipov and Richard Ross) as well as flight attendant Madeleine "Amy" Sweeney. They called their spouse from the airport to tell her/him that the flight was delayed. Furthermore, there are conflicting reports of the gate where Flight 11 started from. Apparently the passengers embarked on a plane at gate 26, not at gate 32 as claimed by the 9/11 Commission. More about this here:

http://911wideopen.com/mirror/twin11-1/twin-11-mod.htm

**Peter Lemkin** · 12-03-2011 08:19 AM

Who was the male in Flight 93's co-pilot seat?09/13/2009 11:07 PM

Leroy Homer jr., co-pilot of United 93

leroy.gif

Strange encounter at Newark Airport

On 9/11, Anthony F. Mazza was working at Newark Airport as a fueler. One of the planes he provided with fuel was United 93. In the cockpit of the plane, he met a person who was apparently neither Leroy Homer, jr, the co-pilot, nor Jason Dahl, the pilot. On Oct. 19, 2001, he was interviewed by the FBI. Here's the FBI report:

Mazza has worked as a fueler for Ogden Aviation Services at Newark International Airport since 1973. Mazza fueled United Airlines flight 93 on September 11, 2001 prior to its departure and crash in western Pennsylvania. Mazza stated that everything seemed normal on the flight including the amount of fuel that was pumped into flight 93's tank.

Mazza stated that prior to the passengers boarding flight 93, he had completed fueling the plane and proceeded to the cockpit to inform the co-pilot of the completed task. This has been the standard operating procedure for United flights out of Newark for many years. Mazza entered the cockpit where he handed the fueling sheet to a young Caucasian male, well groomed, brown hair and a white shirt, who was sitting in the co-pilot's seat. The male responded to Mazza by saying thank you and taking the paper from him. Mazza then departed flight 93 prior to the passengers boarding. Mazza stated that this was approximately 30 minutes prior to the scheduled departure time.

Mazza was interviewed by FAA employee John Patani shortly after the crash in western Pennsylvania. Mazza stated that he reported that there was nothing unusual on the day of the flight and that the plane had been fueled without incident.

On Friday, October 12, 2001 Mazza saw a memorial for the crew of flight 93 and saw pictures of the co-pilot of flight 93. The picture was the actual co-pilot of flight 93, who was Leroy Homer. Mazza stated that he was certain that the co-pilot he spoke with was not Mr. Homer.

http://www.911myths.com/images/e/ed/...LeroyHomer.pdf

The FBI report ends here and leaves the reader to itself with the question: who was the "male" in the co-pilot's seat, if not Leroy Homer? Jason Dahl, the pilot? Given Mazza's report, this only "regular" explanation seems to be highly unlikely. After seeing the memorial, Mazza obviously took the initiative to contact the FBI. Had he identified Dahl - whose picture he certainly saw, too - as the "male", he would not have felt compelled to call the FBI.

When interviewing Mazza, the FBI surely asked him about this possibility and probably showed ihm photos of Dahl again. In any case, the absence of Dahl in the report makes clear that he was not the "male" either. And Dahl was 43, not really a young man like the "male" as described by Mazza.

Jere Longman ("Among the heroes") describes meticulously the United Airlines routine pre-flight procedures. Before the passengers board a plane, it has to be checked, of course. Basically the captain looks after the cockpit instruments along a pre-flight checklist while the first officer checks the plane outside (tires etc.). The fact that Mazza met neither Dahl nor Homer is even more disturbing than the presence of the "male".

This looks like another case of plane duplication. It is already known that according to United Airlines ACARS messages, Flight 93 took off at 8:28, other than the official take-off time 8:42. We have to accustom ourselves to two different "Flight 93" taking off from Newark Airport.

**Peter Lemkin** · 12-03-2011 08:36 AM

Delta 89, Code 7112: The Faker Hijack Exercise08/16/2009 08:08 PM

The NORAD tapes are proof: Delta 89 was not Delta 1989.

Three minutes after the Pentagon was hit, a strange aircraft with call sign "Delta 89" popped up on the radar screens of air defense commander Kevin Nasypany's crew. It signaled a hijacking and was tracked by NEADS for three minutes before it suddenly disappeared again.

In the official story, Delta 89 doesn't exist. Better to say, for the 9/11 Commission as well as authors Michael Bronner and Lynn Spencer ("Touching History"), the plane tracked by NEADS as Delta 89 was in fact Delta 1989, i.e. a case of sloppy communication.

This, however, is impossible. It is easy to show that, apart from the different call sign, Delta 89's transponder code, flight plan and flight path differed from Delta 1989. The evidence is present on the NORAD tapes, a source of impeccable authenticity because you can virtually look over the shoulder of NEADS technicians while they're tracking Delta 89 on their displays.

To demonstrate why Delta 89 was not identical with Delta 1989, I will go through the NORAD tapes step by step and comment on them. But before starting the analysis, we need to get a rough understanding how NEADS radar works - it's quite different from the FAA radar. Lynn Spencer explains in her book "Touching History" (p.32):

Slow and cumbersome, and not nearly as user friendly as more modern equipment, the NEADS monochromic radar displays are not designed to take internal FAA radar data or to identify radar tracks originating from inside the United States. The system offers little, if any, such low-level coverage over the country.
...
Their radar scopes are filled with hundreds of radar returns not just from aircraft but from weather systems, ground interference. and what's called anomalous propagation - false returns caused by conditions in the atmosphere, or by such obstruction as flocks of birds. So the NEADS radar screen is filled with countless radar blips from planes - without the identifying data block common to FAA radar, however - as well as irregular radar returns. Only on special occasions like emergency cases, a plane's blip is highlighted and provided with a data tag. Lynn Spencer (p. 25/26):

Pilots have three special transponder codes that they can dial in: 7500 for hijacking, 7600 for loss of radio, and 7700 for other emergencies. Any of them will cause the airplane's tag to light up on his radar screen, but he doesn't see any such tag.Now we are ready to start with the analysis. The complete transcripts are here. It is highly recommended to listen to the original audio file of the following channels (scroll forward to the respective time):

Channel 4, 1:14:00

Channel 7, 1:09:00

Channel 21, 1:09:00

(Channel 7)9:39:31 Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military. Hijacked aircraft Delta nineteen eighty-nine. I give you the code 1304, presently due south of Cleveland, heading westbound, destination Las Vegas. And is this one a hijack, Sir? We believe it is. Didn't it squawk hijack? We don't umm...I don't know - it's squawking 1304 if you want to crank him up. 767, altitude 350. Where did it take off? Out of Boston. We're trying to get a tail number on that if you want to get someone up.90 seconds before Delta 89 appears on stage, NEADS receives a verbal message from Colin Scoggins, the military liaison controller at Boston Center, regarding Delta 1989. The message is affirmed with professional calm. NEADS knows now that one of the many anonymous radar blips near Cleveland is a possible hijack. Note that Scoggins is wrong on the destination of Delta 1989: that was Los Angeles, not Las Vegas.

(Channel 4)

9:41:00 Delta 89 is a hijack, they think it's a hijack, south of Cleveland, we have a code on him now

9:41:05 Good! Pick it up! Find it!

9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:13 Eight-nine. Boeing 767 Boston-Las Vegas. Another one - same place - Las VegasIn striking contrast to Delta 1989, the appearance of Delta 89 causes big excitement among the NEADS crew. It is echoed through all of the channels. Lynn Spencer interprets this passage as a prompt reaction to Scoggins's message, but there are several reasons why this cannot be the case:

- the different call sign: needless to say, transmitting the correct call sign of an aircraft is an absolute must in aeronautic communication. No air traffic controller would ever get the idea to abbreviate a flight number by omitting the first two digits because that will automatically lead to massive confusion.

- "we have a code on him now" - obviously, the plane has squawked a special emergency code that causes its blip to lighten up on the NEADS radar displays - just as explained above. This is immediately noticed by the NEADS crew and leads to their excited reactions. The data tag informs them about the call sign (Delta 89), the flight plan (Boston-Las Vegas), the type of the plane (Boeing 767) and the cause of the emergency: a hijacking.

- "Another one - same place - Las Vegas" - NEADS is already aware of Delta 1989 which was reported 90 seconds ago by Colin Scoggins. Now Delta 89 - "another one" - appears in the same vicinity. So NEADS does not identify Delta 89 with Delta 1989, but views it as a different plane.

Bottom line: Delta 89's blip suddenly flashes on the NEADS screens - making it easy to follow - and indicates a hijacking. In contrast, Delta 1989's blip is not spotted yet.

(Channel 21)

9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:30 As before is one missing. Start a search. Range 53

9:41:35 288 for 92 miles search only

9:41:46 I have a 280 for 97

9:41:58 I have a 287 for 97

9:42:23 The two really close together. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to himTo understand what's going on here, I cite Lynn Spencer again (p. 32):

To identify American 11, the surveillance and ID techs must go through a grueling process. (...) The technicians must first determine which radar data on their screens is for aircraft, which they do by monitoring its movement, which is distinctive for planes. The technician must observe for at least 36 seconds to a minute just to confirm that a blip is in fact an aircraft track. The tech must attach what's called a tactical display number to it, which tells the computer to start tracking and identifying the target. If the target is in fact a plane, then over a period of 12-20 seconds, the computer will start to generate information on the track: heading, speed, latitude, longitude, and the identifying information being transmitted by the transponder. The NEADS technicians start a "search" for Delta 89, described by Lynn Spencer as a grueling process. But in contrast to American 11, which had turned the transponder off, Delta 89 is tagged, enabling them to curtail the procedure. In the course of the search, they detect two planes "really close together" - Delta 89 and Delta 1989 -, and obtain the squawk code of one of them: 7112. This is not Delta 1989's code, which is 1304, so it must be the code of Delta 89. The first digit "7" indicates that it's not the ID code of an usual civilian airliner - they never begin with a 7. Instead, the 7 is reserved for emergency cases like 7500, 7600, or 7700. By squawking 7112, Delta 89 manages to pop up on the NEADS radar screens and signals a hijacking.

(Channel 4)9:42:43 Indy Center? Indianapolis Center: Delta eight-nine have you information on that aircraft? I want to give you a heads-up. This is another hijacked aircraft, Boston to Las Vegas with a Mode 3 of 1304. We do have contact. ((repeats informations)) . 9:43:04 I give you a latlong if you need that. Go ahead. 4121 North 08215 West. I'll give you a heads-up that's all we have right now, but he's a confirmed hijack 9:43:16 (Indianapolis Center) We don't show him in our system at this point - you are tracking him, you say? We have him on the radar, Sir - he's headed your way. He's headed our way, okay.9:43:35 (Indianapolis Center) Boston to L-A-S, right? L-A-X. L-A-X? I've got Vegas, Sir, whatever Vegas says. L-A-S, okay, Las Vegas. Okay, cause we don't show him in the system anywhere. Do you have Mode 3 capability or anything? He's on a 1304 code? Okay, we bring that up.

Now NEADS contacts Indianapolis Center to inform them that Delta 89 is heading for their airspace. This is evidence that Delta 89 is flying southwest- or southbound at that point because the boundary to Indianapolis Center runs 40 miles south of Cleveland. In contrast, Delta 1989 never goes south, and especially at 9:43, it is flying westbound (direction 285) according to the Cleveland Center/Delta 1989 transcript:

9:40:57 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine fly heading two eight five9:41:00 (Delta 1989) two eight five delta nineteen eighty nine The next radio transmission between Cleveland Center and Delta 1989 occurs at 9:44. In between, there is no order to change the direction, which is proof that Delta 1989 is not heading towards Indianapolis Center at 9:43 like Delta 89 (according to Stacia Rountree from NEADS).

Back to NEADS:

(Channel 4)

9:44:03 Where did it go? Somebody dropped the aircraft. Who dropped the aircraft? I DON'T KNOW!

(Channel 21)9:46:25 (?)52 on a 49 for 59 miles searching. We got a 1304 squawk this time9:46:53 The 1304 guy. That's not the guy thenAt 9:44, Delta 89 is suddenly "lost". NEADS doesn't know where it's gone and is unable to track it. Obviously the pilot has turned off the transponder, making himself virtually invisible. The radar technicians resume the search. At 9:46:25, they are able to identify an eligible blip, but it's Delta 1989 this time. Their comment: "that's not the guy then" - the 7112 guy they lost and were looking for.

Now it's time to sum up the data:

Call sign.................Delta 1989.......................Delta 89

Flight plan..............Boston-Los Angeles.........Boston-Las Vegas

Squawk code..........1304................................ .7112

Direction at 9:43......westbound......................southwest/southbound

Transponder............continously working..........turned off at 9:44

Did the 9/11 Commission overlook these discrepancies? Unlikely. Did Commission staffers not check Channel 21 with the "code 7112" message? Oh yes, they did! On January 23, 2004, Miles Kara, Kevin Schaeffer, and Geoffrey Brown interviewed Sgt. Susan Marie Rose, whose voice is recorded on Channel 21 as she spots "code 7112":
Commission staff asked Rose is she recalled details on tracking Delta Airlines Flight 1989 or United Airlines Flight 93 (UAL 93). She replied that she and LaMarche tracked a specific suspected hijack that they believe was flight planned from Boston to Las Vegas through Cleveland and Minneapolis Center airspace. This flight, she believed, was headed to a specific airport, and he was maneuvering to turn into the airport to land.
Rose noted that she is uncertain whether the aircraft reflected in Commision staff's recording was one that was search only or one that was a mode three. She surmised there being two aircraft that they followed based on listening to the tapes in which she pointed out a mode three squawking code 1304.The "surmise" of Susan Marie Rose is certainly correct, but squawk code 7112, evidence for a second plane, is simply omitted in the report. Miles Kara and his colleagues don't seem to be interested in this other aircraft, despite the strange code and the fact that it was considered a hijacking. Code 7112 and Delta 89 were simply glossed over.

The NORAD tapes belong to the most authentic sources for the events of 9/11, and they are certainly not faked, as everyone will attest who has listened to them. As matters stand, the tapes provide watertight proof that Delta 89 was NOT Delta 1989, Delta 89 being defined as the aircraft that was tracked by NEADS between 9:41 and 9:44.The analysis must not stop at this point. What kind of plane was this Delta 89? Discarding exotic scenarios like a drunken pilot or a foreign intruder playing games with the air defense, the plane's known attributes allow only one reasonable explanation - Delta 89 was a simulated hijacking as part of a military exercise:

- "Delta 89" was a fake call sign. The regular Delta Airlines Flight 89 was sitting at JFK airport and scheduled to depart for Los Angeles at 3:00 p.m.- The behavior of Delta 89 reminds of a hide-and-seek game. To facilitate the catcher's job, it left its cover and "cuckooed" for three minutes before disappearing in the dark again. Note that military exercises are often termed "war games".

- Delta 89 didn't squawk 7500, the emergency code for a "real world" hijacking, but another irregular code - 7112 - that was immediately interpreted as a hijacking by NEADS technicians.

- According to FAA directive 7110.65, certain beacon codes are regularly assigned to planes taking part in NORAD exercises - "7112" seems to have been one of them:

NORAD will ensure exercise FAKER aircraft flight plans are filed containing discrete beacon codes from the Department of Defense code allocation specified in FAAO 7610.4, Special Military Operations, Appendix 8. SourceDelta 89 fulfills all conditions for an "exercise faker aircraft" whose job was to simulate a hijacking. Alternative explanations are hard to imagine. Therefore it's time now to establish the central thesis of this text: Delta 89 was a faker hijack exercise.

So what - the interested reader might ask - what impact has this insight on the official story of the 9/11 attacks? Indeed, Michael Ruppert has already pointed out the existence of at least one "live-fly exercise" (with real aircraft involved) in his book Crossing the Rubicon. Lynn Spencer notes: "Today's training exercise runs a number of scenarios, including a simulated hijacking in which the perpetrators overtake an aircraft for political purposes, directing it to an island in order to seek asylum". (p.24) So is the case of "Exercise Delta 89" important at all?

Yes, it is, because of Delta 1989, which was kind of a "doppelganger" plane with nearly identical call sign (promptly leading to confusion), identical aircraft type (Boeing 767), identical origin airport (Boston), and flying in close vicinity when Delta 89 exposed itself at 9:41. Clearly the designation "Delta 89" was carefully chosen by the wargame designers to create a mix-up with Delta 1989. This is the first indication that the ongoing exercises interfered with regular civilian air traffic.

In other words: Delta 1989, in spite of being a regular airliner, played a peripheral role in the exercise. It served as a cover-up for Delta 89. At first, NEADS was alerted by Delta 89, and when this plane stopped squawking and disappeared, the attention shifted to Delta 1989, which was closely observed until its landing in Cleveland.

Half an hour after Delta 1989, another mysterious airliner in distress landed at Cleveland Airport. Just like Delta 89, its existence seems to have been covered up through "merging" it with Delta 1989 - a doppelganger case again. This naturally leads to the question whether the eerie Cleveland plane was identical to Delta 89. Indeed, there are surprising congruences:

- Both planes were reportedly a 767
- Both planes were reportedly coming from Boston
- Both planes were suspected of being hijacked
- Both planes were covered up by Delta 1989

These coincidences allow the formulation of the working hypothesis that Delta 89 and the Cleveland mystery plane are identical. Confirmation pending.

**Peter Lemkin** · 12-03-2011 08:41 AM

The Cessna witness, the WTC North Tower, and the missing page 2On Nov. 6, 2001, FBI special agent Joan-Marie Turchiano sent a fax to FAA investigator Douglas Gould. The fax consisted of three pages (the page number is in the upper right corner).

Page 1 is the cover sheet with general information.

Page 2 is missing, for whatever reason.

On Page 3, we jump right into an eyewitness statement:

that if the Cessna's transponder was turned off then he would believe that this Cessna was involved in the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.

#########s advised that he was informed by other tenants in the apartment building that they also observed this Cessna. ########### advised that he will contact ############## with witness contact information.

http://www.911workinggroup.org/foia/...der REDACT.pdf

(scroll down to page 12/13)

Page 2 would certainly reveal more interesting information about the circumstances when and where this eyewitness spotted the Cessna. But unbelievably, Page 2 is missing.

Where is Page 2?United 1898 - the Cleveland Airport mystery plane identified!?03/02/2011 06:45 PM

Cleveland_Hopkins_International_Airport_recent_satellite_view.jpg

Another interesting find from the http://www.911workinggroup.org files.

"AAT-200" is a special investigation agency inside the FAA and deals with aircraft accidents, emergency cases, near mid-air collisions, and other irregular incidents. As soon as an accident occurs, the involved controllers are obligated to submit a report to AAT-200:

http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraff...X 10.htm#_ftn1

The information flow is: local FAA facility -> Regional Operations Center (ROC) -> Washington Operations Center (WOC) -> AAT-200. Example: if an accident occurs in the skies over Ohio, Cleveland Center controllers (responsible for Ohio) send their reports to the Great Lakes Regional Operations Center where it is passed on to the WOC and finally the AAT-200.

On 9/11/2001 at 7:30 p.m. AAT-200 updated a request list from the facilities involved in the attacks:

AEA - Voice and CDR data in RAPTOR format from:

New York TRACON Time 0930-1015ET........................ Received
Washington National - Pentagon................................... Received
Dulles - Both Pentagon and Camp David incidents..........received
Pittsburgh - Camp David incident....................................Receiv ed
Washington Center radar for AAL77................................Received
Washington Center voice............................................. .....Received
New York Center radar............................................. .......Received
New York Center voice replay.........................................Rec eived
Voice tape Millville AFSS.............................................. ....Waiting

AGL - Voice and CRD in RAPTOR format:

Cleveland for UAL1898........................................... .....Waiting
Cleveland Center radar for AAL77..................................Received
Cleveland Center voice replay for AAL11......................Received
Indianapolis Center radar............................................. ...Received
Indianapolis voice tape via telephone.............................Received
Cleveland Center radar for DAL1989.............................Waiting
Cleveland Center voice for DAL1989..............................Waiting

ANE - Boston Center radar and voice replay................Received

http://woodybox.info/5 AWA 755 Package Docs on AAT-200 LAN 91101 Subfolder REDACT.pdf

The list addresses FAA en-route centers (identifiable by the affix "Center") and airports. In the latter cases, the affix "airport" is obviously seen as redundant and omitted (Washington National = Washington National Airport).

I have highlighted the most interesting entry. "Cleveland" stands for Cleveland Hopkins Airport (as distinct from Cleveland Center). This means that controllers at Hopkins had reported an incident (emergency landing or the like) involving United 1898. They reported it to AAT-200 via the Great Lakes Regional Operations Center (AGL). And AAT-200 was still waiting for voice and CRD data.

However, the BTS database ( http://www.bts.gov ) reveals that United Airlines operated no aircraft with flight number 1898 on 9/11. In plane language: There was no United 1898. So what airliner was being reported by the controllers of Cleveland Hopkins?

In the light of Cleveland mayor Michael White's famous news conference and ample additional evidence that an airliner with unknown identity made an emergency landing at Hopkins "United 1898" looks like an excellent candidate for this mystery plane:

http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2007...t-mystery.html

http://911review.org/inn.globalfreep...t_Mystery.html

Interestingly, Delta 1989, the plane that also landed at Hopkins and apparently functioned as a cover-up for the mysterious emergency landing, was not reported by Cleveland Airport, but Cleveland Center. This means that Delta 1989 was not seen as an emergency case by airport controllers and therefore not reported to AAT-200. The reason why it was reported by en-route controllers remains to be investigated.

More interestingly, the flight numbers of the two airliners - 1989 and 1898 - are very similar and easy to confound, a curiosity amplifying the impression that Delta 1989 was used as camouflage to send the other plane into oblivion.

Most interestingly, the airline of the mysterious plane seems to be United. The controllers were maybe not able to check if the flight number 1898 was operational , but they were certainly able to recognize the United markings.

The most authentic report on the incident was delivered by the Akron Beacon Journal http://911review.org/brad.com/Woodyb...land-Ohio.html ):

Cleveland Mayor Michael White said at a news conference this morning that a Boeing 767 out of Boston made an emergency landing at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport because of fears a bomb was aboard.

Combining this newspaper report with the AAT-200 paper results in the conclusion that a United Boeing 767 from Boston landed in emergency at Cleveland Hopkins.

The number of the United Boeing 767's departing from Boston is so small that it should narrow down the search for the identity of the mysterious plane considerably.

**Peter Lemkin** · 12-04-2011 03:27 PM

Was Mohamed Atta being employed by American Airlines?05/29/2011 03:54 PM

Diane Graney is the second witness (besides Lynn Howland whom I presented in my last blog entry) with precise recollections of Mohamed Atta, but completely ignored by the 9/11 Commission. Graney worked at Portland Airport on 9/11. She didn't see the alleged hijackers Atta and Al-Omari, but recognized Atta's face from the photo that was published in the aftermath. She is positive that Atta, dressed in an American Airlines uniform and able to identify himself as an AA pilot, tried prior to 9/11 to achieve a jump seat on a US Airways flight.

Compare this to the particulars provided by Lynn Howland. According to her, Atta was "wearing a white pilot type or oxford shirt, no tie and blue pilot type slacks" and carried a "really cheap pilot bag". Furthermore, Atta approached her and asked if she was going to fly American 11. Apparently he wanted to jump seat the flight.

Here is a list of persons who occasionally are allowed to take a jump seat in the cockpit (from Wikipedia): In aircraft, jump seats - which are officially termed auxiliary crew stations - can be located in cockpits or passenger cabins. In cockpits, jump seats are provided for individuals who are not operating the aircraft. These might include trainee pilots, off-duty crew members in transition to another airport (see deadheading), government officials (such as Federal Aviation Administration staff), or airline staff.

There are also witnesses in Florida confirming that Atta boasted about his status as an American Airlines pilot. Yet the 9/11 Commission has completely blacked out the accounts of Lynn Howland and Diane Graney and missed to pursue their hints that Atta presented himself on several occasions as an AA pilot in order to jump seat a certain flight.

Was American Airlines aware about Atta's activities? And why has the 9/11 Commission failed to follow this important trace?

Here is Diane Graney's account (date: 9/22/01):

Diane Graney, date of birth ........... employed as a Customer Service Agent CSA and Ground Security Coordinator GSC, U.S. Airways USAIR, Portland International Jetport, 1001 Westbrook Street, Portand, Maine, telephone number 207775-5210, was interviewed at her place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, she provided the following information:

Graney has been employed with USAIR for approximately twelve years. As a CSA for USAIR, Graney's duties include conducting passenger check-ins, checking baggage, making seat assignments, and issuing tickets. She performs her duties at either the USAIR Ticket Counter or at the individual airport gates. As a GSC, she deals with aircraft, airport, and general security issues.

On September 11, 2001, from 5:00 AM to 1:00 PM, Graney was working at the USAIR ticket counter. At some point in her shift she heard of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, and that one of the flights was American Airlines Flight 11 out of Logan Airport in Boston. As a GSC, she went and pulled the passenger lists for the US AIR flights to Logan to see if any USAIR passengers had a connection to thje flight. Graney saw that there were two passengers on USAIR Flight 5930 to Logan that had a connection to American Airlines Flight 11. The two names were Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari. She also noticed the two were to sit in First Class on American Airlines Flight 11. Graney thought it was suspicious that these two passengers could have taken a better, more direct flight then what they had scheduled.

Graney observed that Atta and Alomari had checked two bags in at the US AIR Ticket Counter, and that Michael Tuohey was the CSA who checked them in. She spoke to Tuohey about the two passengers, and he advised her of what he had observed. She then contacted Chuck Severance, US AIR Station Manager, and informed him of what happened and what she had discovered.

Graney advised that later when she saw Atta's picture on the news, she believed she had seen him before. She thought he may have tried to jump seat once with USAIR, and he was in uniform using an American Airlines pilot identification. She believed that this happened within the last six months. She advised she searched the USAIR jump seat peaperwork to see who had gone through for June 2001, July 2001, and August 2001, but was unable to find Atta's name. She advised the jump seat forms are only kept for 90 days. She became more concerned about this when she heard on the news that some American Airlines uniforms were stolen in Italy.

Graney was then requested to review a photograph array containing twelve pictures of twelve of the alleged hijackers. Graney identified the picture of Mohamed Atta as the person she remembered seeing prior to September 11, 2001 attempting to jump seat a USAIR flight. She also identified the picture of Marwan Alshehhi as someone she had seen sometime at the airport ticket counter. She identified the picture of Waleed Alshehri as someone who looks familiar. Both Graney and the interviewing agent dated and initialed the pictures she identified.A pilot's strange encounter with Atta at Boston Airport04/24/2011 03:48 PM

The following is the official paraphrased statement of an American Airlines pilot, interviewed by the FBI on October 13th, 2001. The witness describes how she was shortly approached by Mohammed Atta inside the AA terminal at Logan Airport. Her account is detailed, credible, and intriguing.

Lynn Marie Florence Howland, First Officer, American Airlines, AA, was interviewed near her home at a Starbucks Café in ................... She was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and nature of the interview. For identification, she advised that she lives and .............................. and has been with American Airlines for eleven years.

Howland explained to the interviewing agent that she has been out of state for several days flying in her job. To assist her recollection she prepared a type written one page chronology of the events regarding the encounter with a person she thought was the suspected hijacker of AA Flight 11 on the morning of September 11, 2001. She advised that she was extremely tired after her flight. She left her home at approximately 10:00 a.m. all times local on the morning of September 10th, flew down to San Francisco to then fly as first officer for the AA red-eye flight from San Francisco to Boston. Checking a dispatch schedule, she indicated she flew AA flight 198 from San Francisco, California to Boston, Massachusetts. She indicated the flight had a 9:50 p.m. departure, with arrival at Logan Airport, Boston at approximately 6:50 a.m. on the morning of September 11th. The equipment was a Boeing 767. She advised that the captain was Douglas Balmain. She was sure that the arrival gate for her flight 198 was Bravo 33. Subsequently she checked with AA dispatch and was told her flight AA 198 became the hijacked AA flight 11.

After almost everyone had deplaned, she went up the jetway ahead of Captain Balmain. She stated as she was standing near the entrance to the jetway, in the passenger lounge, a male individual comes up to her suddenly and asks if she is going to take this plane out, referring to the flight she just brought in. She said no and he abruptly turned and went and sat down. She thought that was extremely rude. Her first impression was that he was a pilot going to fly in the jump seat. While he wasn't in uniform, he may have been wearing a pilot type shirt, open collar. She thought he may have had a rolling pilot flight kit or bag with him, which she described as black vinyl, round top, and incredibly cheap. Again she could not recall anything else, only at that time wanting to get to the hotel and sleep. She said she was so tired, when she got to her hotel room she crashed in bed, in her uniform. She woke up about one p.m. and then found out about the terrorist attacks. She said for the longest time she wasn't even sure that she was dreaming it all, until she saw photographs of the hijackers in the news, she was instantly sure that the indivdual she saw that morning was the suspected hijacker, Mohammed Atta. She added that when she first saw the pictures of the hijackers in the new media, it was like an electric shock when she saw the picture of Atta.

She described the individual she saw that morning as having dark hair, dark eyes and being approximately five feet, eight inches in height. Because she was so tired and just wanted to get to the hotel, she could not recall much, other than he may have had that cheap pilot flight bag. She could not recall anything else and stated that time she had no reason to notice. She did not think that Captain Balmain would have noticed him. As she explained in her notes, the recollection .... (??? - missing text) She was shown a photo spread of six males and instantly chose number 5, which is the terrorist described as Mohammed Atta. She then signed and dated the photo spread under photograph number five. She said that her selection was based totally on her recollection of the morning of September 11th and not from any subsequent photographs she may have seen in the news.

The following are Howland's notes, prepared prior to the interview and scanned directly into this FD-302 and corrected only for scanning errors:

"Flew flight 198 SF-BOS
Departed September 10
Arrived September 11
On the ground approximately 0650 EST
In gate probably at 0700 EST
I left the cockpit first and waited for the captain at the top of the jetbridge in the boarding area.
He was slower maybe 5-7 minutes behind me.
We went to the hotel. I went to sleep called my parents at 1300 EST and they told me what happened.
Later that day I realized it was the aircraft that I had brought in.
That is what I remembered until I saw the photos on TV.
I was instantly sure I have seen Mohammed Atta before could not remember where.

Two days later I was driving my car in at night in the rain and my thoughts were drifting to the horrible loss. I suddenly had a memory of a man approaching me and asking me if I was taking the flight out. I was stunned. Did this really happen? I thought about it some more and remembered Mohammed Atta approaching me and asking me if I was taking flight 11 out. I said "No, I just brought the aircraft in." He turned his back and abruptly walked away and I was a little annoyed with his rudeness but as it was 0400 body clock time I let it go and told myself that people are rude everyday.

This would have been between 0700 and 0720 EST. I think he was wearing a white pilot type or oxford shirt, no tie and blue pilot type slacks. I am unsure about the shirt but perhaps that was what the man he sat down next to was wearing. I also remember him having a really cheap pilot bag. The vinyl one with a rounded top with black plastic squares at the corners.

I spent 2 days trying to decide of this was a true memory and decided it was. I have decided to share this because I felt it was my civic duty."http://www.scribd.com/doc/14094195/T7-B11-FBI-302s-Cockpit-and-American-and-Hijacker-Fdr-FBI-302-S-Entire-Contents

This statement creates a huge problem for the official Atta story: According to the BTS database and other sources, it was about 6:00 a.m. EDT when Flight 198 arrived at the gate, not 7:00 EST. (This is a minor mistake of West Coast resident Lynn Howland and in no way damages the accuracy of her other recollections.) Just at this time, a man identifying himself as Mohammed Atta boarded a Colgan Air flight in Portland, Maine, going to Boston. He did not arrive there before 6:45 EDT.

Conclusion: the "Mohammed Atta" whose face was presented on the news in the days after 9/11 and the "Mohammed Atta" in the blue shirt recorded by a security camera at Portland Airport are not the same person. This confirms the outstanding research of John Doe II who has collected plenty of evidence for the existence of - at least - one double of Atta:

http://johndoeii.blog.com/2011/03/29/mohammed-atta

**Peter Lemkin** · 12-12-2011 05:53 AM

Here is a thread on Pilots For 911 Truth on failed debunker's attempts to refute the data mentioned above in this thread. Again, can't express how important this new information is....messages send AND RECEIVED by two aircraft supposedly that hit the WTC towers twenty minutes earlier.....just won't fit in the official fiction. http://pilotsfor911truth.org/forum/i...hreaded&start=

wolfblitzzer0

Friday, April 26, 2013

Boston,Logan Airport,WTC,9/11,ICTS Israel:9/11 AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE LONG AFTER CRASH

Read Carefully - Hard to Overstate How IMPORTANT THIS IS!

Along with this past discovery - impossible air speeds, the whole story just FALLS APART - A N E W!

Very good blog on the planes that were and the planes that were not what we were told!

The more one looks, the more 9/11 resembles 11/22

More plane hanky-panky on 9/11!

But, wait, there is more and more and more.....

Some of MANY Atta anomalies

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