Friday, January 31, 2020

sec chair chris cox,novastar,patrick byrne, naked shorting lie,emini flashcrash

In 2008 financial criminal chris cox who used his position as W Bush SEC Chair to orchestrate the collapse of the entire U.S. stock market and blamed it all on a made up term called 'naked short selling' of shares.This term defined by the penny stock scamsters led by Agora Inc and National Taxpayers Union founder James Dale Davidson to distract fro illegal pups and dups of Genemax and Endovasc penny stock  frauds  in 2002 ended  being  prooted on by Chris Cox who reoved the Glass_Steagal uptick rule to make it easier to short stocks in the first place.NovStar Financial was the first dividend paying stock to claim its shares were being 'naked shorted' which the penny stock mafia who made up and promoted the term such as Byrne's asssociate Bud Burrell who threatened to torture and murder me for fighting the lie on the internet,defined naked short selling' or naked shorting' as counterfeitting of shares and so they contradicted themselves by claiing Novastar Fincial shares were collpsing in value because Byrne and his associate in crie,deceased Mary Helburn were actually MAKING EXTRA MONEY PROVIDING THEIR very real shares to short sellers !
The SEC has never apoloigized for misinforming the public that shares of Fannie ,Mae,Freddie Mac,

Oct 13, 2008 -'s wack-a-doo CEO Patrick Byrne has been telling every ... with Saunders flailing away on a website he created, and dot-net, now defunct, was officially created to correct alleged misinformation about NovaStar and ... Patrick Byrne of Overstock joined the fray.
... letter scam has Nigerian origens,to tout Patrick Byrne's OSTK and NFI. ... to SS investing in the stock markets,aside from that was organizing it, ...
Perhaps Patrick Byrne and his billionaire insurance company dad Jack were ... their fraudulent internet sites, and ,is a lap dance ...
Dr. Patrick Byrne, founder and president of, commented: "What's ... from that was organizing it, which I didn't know at the time !!!

SEC Enhances Investor Protections Against Naked Short Selling


Washington, D.C., July 15, 2008 - The Securities and Exchange Commission today issued an emergency order to enhance investor protections against "naked" short selling in the securities of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and primary dealers at commercial and investment banks......said SEC Chairman Christopher Cox. "Today's Commission action aims to stop unlawful manipulation through 'naked' short selling that threatens the stability of financial institutions. We will continue our vigorous commitment to investors by working within the SEC and in close cooperation with our regulatory counterparts to promote the continued health and vibrancy of our markets."....

Note that the year before the 2008 stock market crash of the W Bush regie that almost mirrors but is even larger than his father George Herbert Walker Bush's 1987 Savings and Loan real estate stock market crash,Herb Greenberg writes that Novastar Financial was basically a tracking stock and forewarning of  its Fannie ae and Freddie ac big brothers and the reason for its collpse was the greedy shakedown of the poor who W Bush suckered into subprie loans under the guise of home and property ownership for everyone based upon unsustainable MAFIA LIKE LOANS AND DEBT OF SUBPRIME MOPRTGAGES W Bush,, ENCOURAGED FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC TO HELP PROVIDE -NOT THE SO-CALLED FRAULENT CLAIM OF 'NAKED SHORTING' OF THEIR SHARES AS HIS SEC CHAIR CHISTOPHER COX LYINGLY CLAIMED.Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac collpsed and their shares were sold or dumped as the inability of pootr debtors trapped in the housing scas inability to pay and aintain the ponzi scheme  became  apparent.

How NovaStar held clues to mortgage mess

By Herb Greenberg
Published: Nov 26, 2007

If you missed my piece in the weekend Wall Street Journal on how you could have seen the mortgage mess coming by watching NovaStar (no stranger to long-time readers), you can read it here on MarketWatch.

Those of us who pointed out these kinds of things back in the day were laughed off the stage as the market for securitized mortgages grew to be so large that it ignored quality in favor of quantity. Of course, as we all heard at the time, the ratings agencies had given NovaStar's securitizations their Triple-A stamp of approval. "Put bluntly," wrote Howard Hill, the unofficial chief commentator at, which later became when it lost its dot-com status, "the credit quality question is a pure red herring." Hill, a long-time vocal critic of yours truly, was responding to something I had written. He later went on to become the a portfolio manager at Babson Capital, where this past summer he led Babson into an apparent ill-fated, last-ditch, life-saving investment at NovaStar. and dot-net, now defunct, was officially created to correct alleged misinformation about NovaStar and discredit its critics. But its real purpose was to serve as a launching pad for attacks on naked-short-selling, which in turn attempted to blur the lines between legitimate criticism and illegal activity in a Joe McCarthyesque effort to destroy the reputations of anybody who dared attack the emperor. Patrick Byrne of Overstock joined the fray. The emperor, as NovaStar shows, really did have no clothes.

It Teetered, It Tottered, It Was Bound to Fall Down
By Gretchen Morgenson and Joshua Rosner
May 21, 2011

This article was adapted from “Reckless Endangerment: How Outsized Ambition, Greed and Corruption Led to Economic Armageddon,” by Gretchen Morgenson, a business reporter and columnist for The New York Times, and Joshua Rosner, a managing director at the independent research consultant Graham Fisher. The book is to be published on Tuesday by Times Books.

MARC COHODES had heard the stories.

Heard how these guys would give a mortgage to anyone — even to a corpse, the joke went. How the place was run like a frat house.

You wouldn’t believe the things that go on there, his brother-in-law had told him.

So Mr. Cohodes, a money manager in Marin County, Calif., decided to bet against one of the big names of the subprime age: NovaStar Financial.

NovaStar was part of a crop of new lenders that had sprung up in the 1990s. It had been founded by two hard-charging entrepreneurs, Scott F. Hartman and W. Lance Anderson.


The two men had complementary skills. Handling the financial operations, working with Wall Street — that was Mr. Hartman’s job. Mr. Anderson, a born salesman, was the glad-hander. From the start, the pair was paid handsomely. Each man received almost $700,000 in 1997, even though their company was losing money.

Like others in the subprime industry, NovaStar used aggressive accounting that obscured its increasingly precarious finances. As far back as the 1990s, it had to underwrite loads of new loans to offset losses on older mortgages.

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But unlike many of its peers, NovaStar had already survived at least one brush with death. Now, in 2003, Mr. Cohodes was betting that it would not be so lucky again.

Although NovaStar was not a household name in lending, in 2003 the company boasted 430 offices in 39 states. With headquarters on the third floor of an office building in Kansas City, Mo., it was fast becoming one of the top 20 home lenders in the country.

NovaStar was also becoming a Wall Street darling, its shares trading at $30, up from $9.50 in late 2002. Typing NovaStar’s stock symbol into his Bloomberg machine, Mr. Cohodes did a double take. Thirty dollars? Must have used the wrong stock symbol, he thought.

He hadn’t. NovaStar was on a trajectory that would take the shares above $70. Thanks to aggressive management, unscrupulous brokers, inert regulators and a crowd of Wall Street stock promoters, NovaStar’s stock market value would soon reach $1.6 billion.

A beefy, street-smart man fond of sports and sports metaphors, Mr. Cohodes knows every trick executives use to make their companies look better than they are. He prides himself on being able to spot trouble

Most investors are optimists and believe that companies will increase in value. Short-sellers are the opposite.

And because they challenge company spin, short-sellers are often criticized and refused access to management.

RARE is the corporate executive with an appreciation for naysayers, and NovaStar’s founders were no different. Mr. Anderson and Mr. Hartman had contempt for short-sellers. A Web site sponsored by NovaStar backers, called, published a picture of a cockroach next to a discussion about investors who had bet against the company’s stock.

But Mr. Cohodes was relentless, and he often shared his research with regulators at the Securities and Exchange Commission.


He figured that if he was right about NovaStar, and he was certain he was, investors everywhere would be better off if he shared his findings with investigators. The sooner the S.E.C. put a stop to improprieties, the better.

The short-sellers would benefit too, of course, if an S.E.C. investigation and civil suit confirmed what Mr. Cohodes and others had found. Even the simple disclosure that an investigation into a company’s practices had been started could crush its stock.

So in February 2003, Mr. Cohodes started corresponding with the S.E.C. about NovaStar. He began “throwing things over the wall,” as he put it, to Amy Miller, a lawyer in the division of enforcement. By this time, loan production at NovaStar was clocking $600 million a month, up from $48 million a month five years earlier.

Among the questionable practices that are the easiest to find are those that appear in a company’s own financial statements. With a little determination and expertise, accounting practices that burnish financial results or make earnings appear out of nowhere can often be spotted in these documents.

Taking his pencil to NovaStar’s statements, Mr. Cohodes found a raft of red flags. “They made their numbers look however they wanted to,” he recalls. “Not even remotely realistic.”

One tactic gave the company lots of leeway in how it valued the loans held on its books. Another allowed it to record immediately all the income that a loan would generate over its life, even if that was decades. This accounting method ignored the possibility that some of the company’s loans might default. NovaStar assumed that losses on all of its loans would be nonexistent.

This was the same stratagem that killed off almost all subprime lenders when the Russian debt crisis rocked the world’s financial markets in 1998.

NovaStar’s rosy assumption not only padded its profitability but also encouraged the company to make more mortgages, regardless of quality. The more loans it made, the more fees and income the company could record.

After some digging, Mr. Cohodes found that NovaStar’s lending practices were lax and rife with hidden fees.

Promotional memos NovaStar sent to its 16,400 unsupervised mortgage brokers across the country told the tale of easy credit terms. “Did You Know NovaStar Offers to Completely Ignore Consumer Credit!” one screamed. “Ignore the Rules and Qualify More Borrowers with Our Credit Score Override Program!” boasted another.

Mr. Cohodes and other NovaStar critics believed that they had found a company whose success was built on deceptive practices. What they did not recognize was that NovaStar was a microcosm of the nationwide home-lending assembly line that would lead directly to the credit crisis of 2008.

IN Atlanta, Patricia and Ricardo Jordan learned the hard way how NovaStar’s freewheeling lending practices imperiled unsuspecting borrowers.

The Jordans had bought their three-bedroom home in a middle-class section of southwestern Atlanta in 1983 for $30,000. Ms. Jordan had made many improvements on the property, putting up a fence and installing an attic fan and air-conditioning. The sole breadwinner in the family, she supported her husband, a physically and mentally disabled Vietnam veteran. In 2000, she retired and they lived on Social Security and veteran benefits.

In 2004, she had a 9 percent adjustable-rate mortgage that she wanted to change to a fixed-rate loan. She received an offer in the mail from NovaStar and called the toll-free number.

“I told them I wanted to come out of the adjustable and they said they would give me the fixed rate if I would accept it at 10 percent,” Patricia said. “I could have stayed where I was but I told them definitely a 30-year fixed rate.”

The Jordans were more or less perfect targets for a lender like NovaStar. They were financially unsophisticated, and they were trusting.

Unbeknownst to the Jordans, their NovaStar loan was one of the most punitive out there: an adjustable-rate mortgage with an initial interest rate of 10.45 percent that would soon explode to 17.25 percent. Even the initial monthly housing payment, including taxes and insurance, was barely affordable: $1,215.33. As documented in their loan file, the Jordans’ total monthly net income was only $2,697. Their monthly housing and other debt costs totaled $1,642, so after they paid their debts each month, the Jordans had only $1,055 to live on.

And that was just the beginning. Two years after signing up for the loan, its interest rate was set to ratchet up. Only then did Ms. Jordan learn that NovaStar had put her into an adjustable loan, not the fixed rate she had been promised.

Marc Cohodes, a short-seller who has shifted gears to work on his farm and raise chickens, sounded alarms about the mortgage lender NovaStar for years.Credit...Thor Swift for The New York Times
“I got duped,” she contended.

The Jordans sued NovaStar in 2007. As part of the lawsuit, their lawyer found that their loan had been placed in a mortgage securitization trust assembled by NovaStar and sold to investors in November 2004. More than half of the loans in the pool were provided with no documentation or limited documentation of borrowers’ financial standing.

But the Jordans had given NovaStar bank statements and other documentation of their income. The lawsuit would show that NovaStar had inflated their monthly income by $500 to make the loan work. The lender had given the Jordans a loan that went against its own underwriting guidelines and that overrode federal lending standards.

The Jordans’ was just one loan. There were literally thousands more like it. (NovaStar settled with the Jordans in 2010. The terms were undisclosed.)

Because NovaStar was not a bank, its lending practices were largely lost on state and federal regulators. Traditional banks operate under the scrutiny of financial regulators like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which was set up to protect depositors after the huge bank failures of the Great Depression. But for companies like NovaStar, the closest thing to an overseer was an occasional state regulator who took action when it discovered that the company’s independent salespeople were unlicensed.

Massachusetts was one state whose regulators recognized the threats posed by the likes of NovaStar. In October 2003, the state’s commissioner of banks filed a cease-and-desist order against NovaStar, concluding that the company engaged in “acts or practices which warrant the belief that the corporation is not operating honestly, fairly, soundly and efficiently in the public interest.”

Nevada followed with its own order in early 2004. NovaStar started closing operations in Massachusetts and Nevada, but only belatedly told the public about its regulatory reprimands.

As the housing bubble inflated, NovaStar was able to convince many of its shareholders that its mistakes were honest ones and were immaterial to its growing business. The company hired Lanny Davis, a well-connected lobbyist and public relations operative, to run interference. Mr. Davis was used to operating in a crucible; he had been special counsel to President Bill Clinton during the Monica Lewinsky scandal.

But NovaStar’s problems were not limited to a few aggressive state regulators. In the summer of 2004, the inspector general for the Department of Housing and Urban Development produced a damning report on NovaStar’s practices. HUD’s inspector general determined that the company’s branch system did not comply with federal regulations; among the deficiencies HUD cited was the company’s practice of hiring independent contractors as loan officers. NovaStar’s branch system, HUD said, was designed to shift risk from the company to the federal government. HUD recommended that NovaStar pay penalties in the case.

NovaStar did not disclose the HUD report to investors. All the while, Mr. Cohodes was continuing to talk to Ms. Miller and others at the S.E.C. about NovaStar. He sent them information about the company, including the NovaStar fliers indicating its anything-goes lending practices. He annotated the transcript of one of NovaStar’s conference calls with analysts and investors, pointing out to the investigators the many inaccurate statements made by the company’s executives.

Although some of the S.E.C. people he spoke with seemed to recognize the problems in NovaStar’s operations, their investigation did not appear to be gaining traction.

The phone calls with the regulators went over the same material repeatedly, Mr. Cohodes recalls, leading him to conclude that Ms. Miller and her colleagues did not understand what was happening at NovaStar.

Scott F. Hartman oversaw NovaStar's finances.Credit...David Pulliam/The Kansas City Star

“Whenever they seemed to get it, they would either call up or make contact frantically saying, ‘Can you please go over this again?’ ” Mr. Cohodes said. “It was almost like someone was presenting a case to the higher-ups and they would say, ‘Are you sure? Go back and make sure.’ ”

One matter whose importance the agency would surely recognize, Mr. Cohodes thought, was a lawsuit showing that NovaStar’s leading mortgage insurer, the PMI Group, had stopped insuring the lender’s loans. He passed his information along to the S.E.C., including names and phone numbers of people to talk to at PMI.

Mr. Cohodes also gave the agency information about some NovaStar branches that were either nonexistent or questionable. Opening new offices helped the company persuade investors that business was booming. But some strange stuff turned up when Mr. Cohodes and some colleagues took a road trip to see NovaStar’s offices.

“A posse of us went to Vegas, which was their growth market,” he recalls. “We found one branch in a massage parlor, another in a guy’s house,” he says. “After that, I wrote to the S.E.C. again and basically said, ‘Someone should go in here and make sure these numbers are right.’ ”

To most outsiders, NovaStar’s operations seemed to be running on all cylinders. During 2004, the company wrote $8.4 billion in mortgages; that September, the amount of loans held on its books had reached $10 billion. NovaStar ended that year with 600 offices.

It was time for Mr. Hartman and Mr. Anderson to take a victory lap. “The $10 billion mark is a tribute to NovaStar associates and our many partners in the mortgage community,” Mr. Hartman told a reporter at Origination News, an industry publication. But while NovaStar executives high-fived each other, a unit of Lehman Brothers, Wall Street’s largest packager of residential mortgage loans sold to investors, was discovering serious problems in a review of NovaStar mortgages. The findings were so troubling to the Lehman executives overseeing the firm’s purchases of NovaStar loans that they ended their relationship with NovaStar in 2004.

According to documents filed in a borrower lawsuit against NovaStar, Aurora Loan Services, a Lehman subsidiary, studied 16 NovaStar loans for quality-control purposes. What the analysis found: more than half of the loans — 56.25 percent, to be exact — raised red flags. “It is recommended that this broker be terminated,” the report concluded.

Among the problems turned up by the Aurora audit were misrepresentations of employment by the borrower, inflated property values, transactions among parties that were related but not disclosed, and unexplained payoffs to individuals when loans closed.

The details uncovered by Aurora were alarming. One NovaStar loan on a property in Ohio totaled $77,500 even though the average sales price for the neighborhood was $31,685, and the same house had been purchased two months earlier for $20,000.

S.E.C. rules require the disclosure by company management of information considered material to the company’s prospects or an investor’s analysis. In a 1999 S.E.C. bulletin, the commission defined materiality this way: “A matter is ‘material’ if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important.” Two Supreme Court cases use the same standard.


Surely, Aurora’s findings that more than half of the sampled NovaStar loans were questionable would have been an important consideration for the S.E.C.’s “reasonable person.”

Lance Anderson was salesman in chief of NovaStar.Credit...Mike Ransdell/The Kansas City Star

Still, NovaStar failed to alert investors or the public at large to the Aurora analysis. Nor did NovaStar publicize the fact that Lehman Brothers had stopped buying its loans.

Increasingly frustrated, Mr. Cohodes and the other NovaStar short-sellers kept throwing information over the wall at the S.E.C. But the inquiry soon seemed moribund.

“We kept going to the government from the time the company had a $300 million market cap, a $600 million market cap until it had a $1 billion market cap,” Mr. Cohodes said, referring to NovaStar’s rising stock price.

To keep its money machine running, NovaStar regularly issued new shares to the public. Between 2004 and 2007, for instance, the company raised more than $400 million from investors. To those critical of NovaStar’s practices, this was money the company should never have been allowed to raise from investors who were kept in the dark by the company’s disclosure failings.

Mr. Cohodes reckons that over roughly four years, he conducted hundreds of phone calls with the S.E.C. about NovaStar. Each time, he would walk them through his points. Sometimes, a higher-up would get on the phone and contend that while NovaStar’s practices were indeed aggressive, the company did not appear to be breaking the law. NovaStar’s selective disclosures — it was quick to report good news but failed to own up to problems on many occasions — seemed to be infractions that the S.E.C. should have dealt with. But its investigation went nowhere.

In any case, by 2006, the wheels had started to come off the NovaStar cart. The company’s net income that year was less than half what it earned in 2005. The company faced a number of lawsuits, including a class action filed in Washington State in December 2005 alleging that NovaStar failed to disclose to borrowers the fees earned by brokers. Plaintiffs contended that NovaStar had violated consumer protection laws. In 2007, NovaStar agreed to pay $5.1 million to resolve the claims of about 1,600 Washington borrowers.

Its stock was falling, too. By late 2006, NovaStar was trading at around $30; but in the first few months of 2007, as the money for subprime lenders began drying up and these companies started closing their doors, it plummeted to $5. The company halted mortgage lending and stopped paying its dividend.

In March 2007, Mr. Anderson dismissed as insignificant the HUD report and the lawsuits the company had attracted. “Clearly we’re going through a tough time right now,” he told a reporter. “But we think the loans we are originating today will perform very well. We were surprised by the speed and severity of the downturn, but I think NovaStar will be a survivor.”

He was wrong. NovaStar’s shares collapsed, wiping out roughly $1 billion in market value from the peak of the stock price. Despite the implosion, between 2003 and 2008, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Hartman each made about $8 million in salary, bonuses and stock grants.

Neither man was ever sued by the S.E.C. or any other regulator. As is its custom, the S.E.C. declined to comment on the NovaStar inquiry or the agency’s discussions with short-sellers. But documents supplied by the S.E.C. under the Freedom of Information Act show the extensive communications between Mr. Cohodes and the agency. Ms. Miller, still at the S.E.C., declined to comment.

“It would be interesting to see who exactly dropped the ball, and why,” Mr. Cohodes said. “It would be interesting why nothing was ever brought. The S.E.C. should have sent a plane for us to come to D.C. and say: ‘How do we make sure this doesn’t happen again?’ ”

NOVASTAR no longer underwrites mortgages. Its shares were delisted by the New York Stock Exchange and now trade for about 41 cents a share. The company, a shadow of its former self, runs a property appraiser and a financial services unit that provides banking services “to meet the needs of low- and moderate-income-level individuals.”

In a 2010 report to shareholders, Mr. Anderson reported that the company had “several interesting initiatives under way.” Mr. Hartman has left the company. At the end of 2009, NovaStar management concluded that the company’s financial reporting was “not effective.”

NovaStar had, in essence, confirmed what Mr. Cohodes had been telling the S.E.C. all along. The company’s financial reports just couldn’t be trusted.

Friday, January 24, 2020

Hoffenberg on Jeffrey Epstein Financial crimes,Maxwell_Epstein Israel Mossad connections

JEFFREY Epstein would boast to his pals that he was selling the Duke of York's secrets to Israel’s intelligence agency Mossad, his former "mentor" has claimed.

Steven Hoffenberg also claims Epstein met Prince Andrew years earlier than the royal says their friendship began - and used to talk of the prince as his "Super Bowl" trophy.

Hoffenberg and Epstein criminally masterminded one of the biggest Ponzi schemes in history, fraudulently ripping off investors of nearly half a billion dollars in the late Eighties and early Nineties until their scam was busted by the FBI.

In an exclusive interview, Hoffenberg says he is revealing the "75 per cent about Epstein" that no one else has ever told before, claiming: "I’m the only eyewitness, who can tell what Epstein said about the intelligence, rapes and finances."

Hoffenberg - a born-again Christian who is helping in the legal cases of Epstein’s rape victims - said Epstein’s alleged madame Ghislaine Maxwell introduced the disgraced financier to the prince in the early nineties - years earlier than 1999, which is when the Prince claims they met.

“Epstein was a bragger, a boaster,” Hoffenberg told The Sun........

he 74-year-old widower, who now lives in Connecticut, claims that Epstein told him about his blackmail plots, which became ever more sophisticated, especially when the Maxwell became involved.

Cameras were set up in all his houses, his private plane, nicknamed the Lolita Express, and Epstein threw parties for his high profile friends, providing a roster of younger, underage women, Hoffenberg said.

Hoffenberg, who attended some of these parties, says that any recordings and information was used for financial gain and also given to Mossad, the feared Israeli intelligence service.

“He told me that Ghislaine Maxwell was going to be the breakthrough to bring him into that orbit - to be able to part of the agency in Israel - and that’s what did occur," he said..........

Jeffrey Epstein's Former Business Associate: I Want To Assist Victims
August 14, 20196:57 PM ET

Steven Hoffenberg was arrested by FBI agents in Arkansas in 1996, after regulators accused him of defrauding investors.

Danny Johnston/AP

At 74, Steven Hoffenberg spends a lot of time reflecting on his long and checkered past, which included a lengthy prison sentence for running a Ponzi scheme.

Since last weekend, he says his thoughts have increasingly turned to the man he says conspired with him in that scheme — the notorious sex criminal Jeffrey Epstein, who was found dead in his cell at New York's Metropolitan Correctional Center last Saturday.

"There's so much going through my mind about me and Epstein. It's a lifetime of errors. How do you correct a lifetime of errors?" Hoffenberg asks. He spoke to NPR from a hospital bed, where he was awaiting surgery.

Epstein is widely seen as someone who managed to dodge accountability for his actions. His 2006 arrest for sex crimes involving under-aged girls in Florida resulted in a plea deal that was widely seen as very lenient. Hoffenberg maintains that Epstein also got away with financial crimes.

During his lifetime, Epstein was known as a man who lived a life of opulence. He threw lavish parties for his rich and powerful friends at his many homes, which included one of the largest mansions in Manhattan and a private island in the Virgin Islands, where he ferried his friends on a private jet.

Hoffenberg says he was introduced to Epstein by a British business acquaintance in the 1980s, and they quickly became friends.

"He appeared to be brilliant, extraordinarily gifted and talented in convincing people to buy from him. And a criminal mastermind," Hoffenberg says.

Hoffenberg hired him at the financial company he ran, Towers Financial. Epstein had a vast network of wealthy connections and helped Hoffenberg raise money on Wall Street.

"He knew many people in the brokerage business that sold securities and they gave him access to investors," he recalls.

Together, the two men acquired the parent company of two Illinois insurance firms, and then used the money in a failed bid to acquire the troubled airliner Pan Am. They also drained hundreds of millions of investors' dollars and Towers Financial eventually was forced into bankruptcy, Hoffenberg acknowledges.

"This was a criminal investment enterprise. So I'm not trying to state to you that there was a purpose that should be complimented," he says.

Hoffenberg would plead guilty to mail fraud, tax evasion and obstruction of justice in 1995, and would eventually serve 18 years in prison.

Epstein was never charged in connection with the scheme, although Hoffenberg says he told federal prosecutors about his role.

"There's no question that I told them. It makes no sense. Like his whole life makes sense. His death makes no sense," Hoffenberg says

Why Epstein escaped prosecution is something of a mystery. The federal prosecutor who handled the case, Dan Nardello, declined to comment, saying he never discusses cases he prosecuted.

Former prosecutor Amy Millard came into the case late, during sentencing, and says she remembers little about it after 25 years. But she says Hoffenberg appeared to be a less than trustworthy witness.

"I remember that at the point that I met him and had any dealings with I did not believe he was credible in his statements," says Millard, who's now in private practice at the law firm Clayman and Rosenberg.

Millard also remembers that Hoffenberg in the courtroom showed little sympathy for the many thousands of small investors who had lost money in the scheme.

"I remember that he was extraordinarily arrogant, not taking responsibility for what he had done and that there were a huge number of victims who were hurt by his behavior."

Today Hoffenberg says he is eager to atone for what he did, and says he called some of the victims and urged them to sue Epstein to recoup some of their money.

One of the victims did file a class-action suit against Epstein last year, but the suit was withdrawn after his lawyers argued that the statute of limitations had passed on whatever crimes had been committed.

Hoffenberg says he's still available to help the victims and would testify on their behalf.

"I'm the first one in the line to assist the victims," he says. "At 74, I'd like to go to the pearly gates assisting the victims."

Sunday, January 19, 2020


Tony Ryals says:
Thanks for posting the thermate experiment.I saw one or two youtube classroom type thermate experiments and I remember some burning and melting but never any exploding like this and none showed thermate cutting a beam like this,I just presumed explosives were also used.They still may have been,particularly at the base of the buildings where people are recorded having heard explosions early on.
Also very intersting information about thermate having been used in 1935 to down one of those World Fair towers in Chicago.
The video is worth reposting.



These images, pulled from the annals of Popular Mechanics, show the thermite devices attached to the steel frame of the East Skyride Tower (left), and the Tower tipping over after the thermite melted the legs (right)
The editors at Popular Mechanics have made a name for themselves as ardent defenders of the official 9/11 story. Editor-in-Chief James Meigs and contributing writers have presented articles in the magazine that dismiss the scientific evidence of controlled demolition of the WTC skyscrapers and characterize the discovery of thermitic residue in the WTC dust as insignificant. However, a recent review of the Popular Mechanics archives has revealed that this “world-renowned” publication reported on the use of thermite to bring down steel structures over 75 years ago.

The SkyRide Towers, an attraction built for the Chicago World’s Fair in 1933, consisted of two 628-foot-tall steel towers, connected by an aerial suspension system that ferried passengers from one tower to the other. At the time, its staggering height made it the tallest structure in Chicago.

Two years after its construction, the Skyride Towers attraction was closed and scheduled for demolition. The October 1935 issue of Popular Mechanics reported that while demolition teams used conventional dynamite to bring down the West tower, they decided to bring the East Tower down with a thermite compound, which was used to melt two of the steel legs:

Huge “overshoes” in the form of cupolas made of steel and lined with firebrick were constructed around two legs of the tower and filled with 1,500 pounds of thermite, a mixture of aluminum and iron oxide. When fired by electricity, the thermite generated a temperature of more than 5,000 degrees about the two legs, melting the ten-foot sections almost instantly, causing the tower to tip and then to crash.
Unfortunately, today’s Popular Mechanics heads have failed to acknowledge this demolition in their defense of the official 9/11 conspiracy theory. In an NPR interview that aired last August, Meigs admitted that “in certain applications, [thermite] can actually burn through metal,” but he then dismissed the discovery of thermitic residue in the WTC dust, stating that “the notion that you could rig a building with thermite to bring it down… every demolition expert we talked to just laughs at the whole idea.”
The iconic Reichstag dome stood for 60 years until demolition experts used thermite to bring it down
A search through national news archives has brought up another famous example of thermite-assisted demolition that contradicts Meigs’ claims. The steel-framed roof of the German Reichstag, which survived arson in 1933 and Allied bombardment during World War II, was felled by thermite charges in 1954.

It is important to note that the Skyride Towers and the Reichstag dome were not skyscraper buildings like the Twin Towers and WTC 7, and the type of thermite used at the time required massive quantities of material. However, their destruction clearly established the use of thermite as an agent in the controlled demolition of steel-framed structures.
Clipped from the Nov 20, 1954 issue of the Ottawa Citizen, this explosive report also appeared in the New York Times and other major newspapers
In addition, analysis of the WTC dust shows that more sophisticated forms of thermite have been developed over the decades. The research conducted by Dr. Neils Harrit, along with an international team of scientists, has revealed that the composite materials are microscopic in scale, with particle sizes in the nanometer range. This level of precision results in a compound more accurately referred to as nano-thermite, which has a lower ignition temperature and a more energetic reaction.

Harrit explained these characteristics in the new documentary, 9/11: Explosive Evidence – Experts Speak Out. “It isn’t just two powders being ignited,” he said. “The material is actually being produced at the atom scale, which is what we do in nanotechnology.”

These advanced properties allow the nano-thermite to cut through steel in a fraction of a second, and make it a more effective tool than conventional thermite.
The red-gray chips of un-ignited nano-thermite found in the WTC dust have properties that intensify their destructive power
Another key distinction is that the destruction scenario that best addresses the explosive sounds and flashes reported at the WTC, the violent ejection of building materials, and the discovery of molten iron microspheres in the dust, is a demolition that uses some combination of thermitic incendiaries and explosive material. The thermitic residue may be the most apparent forensic evidence that the WTC skyscrapers were intentionally demolished.

Even more important than the possible demolition scenarios, however, is the mere presence of this incendiary material in the dust. The technical paper detailing these findings, which has been published in the Bentham Open Chemical Physics Journal, was peer reviewed and has withstood the scrutiny of experts – given that it has not been challenged in the peer-reviewed process. The chemical reactions that these scientists identified are clear proof that the official explanation is false, and a real, independent investigation is needed to find out who brought these buildings down.

Friday, January 10, 2020

Jews  Proven Greatest Terrorists Of 20th And 21st Century

Coat Bomb and Explosive Prosthesis: British Intel Files Reveal How the Zionist Stern Gang Terrorized London

MI5's dossiers on the group released this week cast the Cold War's early years in a stark new light: Terrorism, not the Soviet Union, was the main threat
Records declassified this week by Britain’s Security Service, MI5, reveal an urgent terrorist threat that Britain faced in the 20th century. No, it wasn’t the Irish Republican Army or Islamist terrorist groups that would plague Britain later in the century, but rather extremist Zionist groups fighting the British after World War II to establish the State of Israel.

In July 1946, one of these groups, the Irgun, led by the future Israeli prime minister and Nobel Peace Prize winner Menachem Begin, blew up the headquarters of the British administration in Palestine, Jerusalem’s King David Hotel, with heavy loss of civilian life and damage. The newly released MI5 files show that another group fighting the British, the Lehi or “Stern Gang,” dispatched cells to carry out bombings and assassinations in Britain itself. The Stern Gang is thought to be the world’s last terrorist group to describe itself publicly as “terrorist,” with some of its members using the term as a badge of honor.
In April 1947, two Stern Gang terrorists, a man and a woman, attempted to blow up the Colonial Office in Whitehall in the center of London. They planted a bomb containing 24 sticks of explosives at Dover House, headquarters of the Colonial Office, but it failed to go off because it was not fused correctly. The head of London’s Special Branch, commander Leonard Burt, believed that if the bomb had gone off, it would have caused as much damage as the bombing of the King David Hotel in London nine months earlier.

The Stern Gang’s attempted bombing of the Colonial Office in London has been previously revealed. But the files released this week are the first public records from British intelligence’s secret archives to show how the Stern Gang operators were tracked down. They also reveal significant new facts about the plot and aspects of it that apparently MI5 did not detect.

In June 1947, two months after the attempted bombing of the Colonial Office, a Stern Gang cell operating in Italy posted 21 letter bombs to senior British politicians and cabinet members including Prime Minister Clement Attlee, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and Chancellor of the Exchequer Stafford, Cripps as well as Winston Churchill. Most of the letter bombs were intercepted, but some reached their intended recipients and failed to go off.

The Conservative Party’s Anthony Eden carried a letter bomb disguised in a book around with him for a whole day, until he was warned of the plot and checked inside his briefcase, where it was. British explosive experts reported that all the letter bombs were potentially lethal. One Stern Gang member involved in the plot later claimed that he had “invented the book bomb.”

French-Belgian border check
In the wake of the Colonial Office and letter bombs, borders and ports in Britain were placed on high alert to look for suspicious people potentially planning further attacks, and MI5 placed known extremist Jewish and Zionist groups in Britain under intense surveillance. But as one MI5 officer wrote in an internal memo, “these terrorists are hard nuts to crack.”
In a routine inspection that same month, June 1947, Belgian police stopped and searched two people, a man and a young woman, at the border crossing to France. The woman’s suitcase was found to have a false bottom with a secret compartment. It contained letters addressed to British officials, together with explosives, 14 pencil-type batteries, seven detonators and a watch constructed as a time fuse — similar to the letter bombs sent earlier that month and the bomb rigged up at the Colonial Office.

The man and woman were arrested by the Belgian police, who, because of the envelopes addressed to British officials, contacted the British authorities. It didn’t take MI5 long to conclude that the pair had been planning to carry out bomb attacks in Britain. One of the letters, soon to be a letter bomb, was addressed to the chief secretary of the Palestine Administration, Sir John Shaw, who later secretly worked for MI5.
The arrested 22-year-old woman was identified as Betty Knouth, who also went under the name Gilberte Elizabeth Lazarus. She was a French national who had served with the Resistance during the war and was now, as she put it, at war with Britain. She was sentenced to a year in prison in Belgium for carrying explosives.
Checking its records, MI5 quickly discovered that Knouth fitted witness descriptions of an attractive young woman seen at the Colonial Office when the bomb was left, carrying a distinctive blue-leather miter-shaped handbag, which was still in her possession when she was arrested in Belgium. Knouth also admitted to being in Britain at the time of the Colonial Office bomb.
The arrested man went under the name Jacob Elias, but when his fingerprints were sent to London, his real identity was established as Yaacov Levstein, who had a long track record as a terrorist. His named appeared on the “Terrorist Index” compiled and circulated by the Palestine police and MI5.
Levstein had been a member of the Stern Gang throughout the war, and was wanted by the Palestine police for his believed killing of numerous police officers and an attempt on the life of the British high commissioner. He had been captured and sentenced to life imprisonment in Palestine, but escaped from jail. His fingerprints matched those found on the timer of the failed bomb at the Colonial Office. He was given eight months in prison in Belgium for carrying concealed explosives.
‘We are still at war with Britain’
At a Stern Gang press conference in Tel Aviv after her release from jail, Knouth said in response to a question: “Did I post letter bombs? Unfortunately the Belgian police got me before I could do so. They are a Stern Gang patent you know.”
Asked if she had anything to do with the bomb left at the Colonial Office, she said: “Scotland Yard could give you very precise details about that, but I don’t consider this the right time to time to talk about it. We are still at war with Britain. But my terrorist days are over and done with now. I hope to settle down in Israel one day.”
Britain’s intelligence records released this week reveal that MI5 did not detect some terrorist operations. The files note that Levstein was an “expert in explosives” but do not grasp the true devilish nature of his expertise. The files correctly record that a French veteran associated with Levstein, Jacques Martinsky, was denied entry when he landed in London in March 1947 for showing no good reason why he was traveling to Britain.
However, MI5 appears not to have detected that, on Levstein’s instructions, Martinsky was using the prosthetic leg that he acquired after being wounded in the war to smuggle explosives into Britain for the Colonial Office bomb. This was a lucky escape for British security.
Where Martinsky failed, another of Levstein’s group got through. As Levstein later explained, he succeeded in getting explosives for the Colonial Office bomb into Britain by devising an ingenious “coat bomb” with explosives stitched inside. It was worn by another of his accomplices, Robert Misrahi, a French student and protégé of Jean-Paul Sartre at the Sorbonne who carried this dynamite coat from Paris across the Channel to Britain.
The new files show that Misrahi’s name was on MI5’s radar, but there is no evidence that the security service detected the plot. As Levstein later put it: “The execution was perfect. I learned an important lesson. No security measures can stop sophisticated imaginative planning.
MI5’s dossiers on Stern Gang members released this week cast the early years of the Cold War in a stark new light — terrorism, not the Soviet Union, was the main threat. The newly released files also have an enduring legacy. Many of the security techniques British intelligence developed to deal with the Irgun and Stern Gang — surveillance of extremist groups, border and port checks, liaison with foreign police agencies — were the same counterterrorist procedures later used against the IRA and current Islamist terror groups.
Calder Walton is an Ernest May Fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. His book “Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire” was published by Harper Press in 2013. Follow him on Twitter @calder_walton.